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Abstract 
How a single party and personal dictatorship survive has been a question of much debate among 
scholars. Geddes (1999, 2003) creates a model to determine which survives the longest. Within 
her model, she finds that a single party dictatorship – one with a party apparatus – survives 
longer than a personal dictatorship – one where a single person has sole policymaking ability. 
She argues that the fundamental difference between the two is how each treats the opposition. 
The party apparatus allows a single party dictatorship the means to silence the opposition by 
coopting it into the party structure whereas a personal dictatorship must rely on the wealthy and 
military to keep any opposition at bay. With a single party dictatorship being able to coalesce the 
opposition, this dictatorship is more stable and survives longer. I agree with Geddes’ reasoning 
and seek to clarify how this situation works in Sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that a single party 
dictatorship can silence and use religious leaders in the opposition to gain support from the 
religious leaders’ followers. This additional support from the religious leaders and the followers 
makes single party dictatorships survive longer than personal dictatorships in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In this research, I explain the importance of religion as a variable for dictatorship survival 
research in Sub-Saharan Africa. I show that religious leaders have a certain level of control over 
followers and if coopted by a dictatorship, religious leaders’ control garners support among 
followers. I further explain how religious leaders are in the opposition and therefore can only be 
coopted by a single party dictatorship. I conclude by showing that religious leaders increase a 
single party dictatorship’s survival likelihood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa, Africa, Dictatorship, Dictatorship Survival 
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Chapter 1: Holy Introduction 
Since independence, dictatorships have plagued Sub-Saharan Africa since and thwarted any 
trajectory, for certain countries on the continent, to become democratic societies. These 
dictatorships committed and continue to commit atrocious human rights violations. In most 
cases, created societies that are instable and on the brink of economic collapse. Understanding 
the mechanics of dictatorship survival allows for appropriate policy making so as not to support 
these forms of government to endure.   
According to Geddes (1999; 2003), a single party dictatorship – one that has a party 
apparatus for policy decisions – survives longer than a personal dictatorship – one that has a 
dictator who has sole policy making capacity. Both types rely on a core group of elites, typically 
the wealthy and military, to provide the dictatorship with the ability to guard against challenges 
from citizens. This dictatorship-elite relationship is paramount for dictatorship survival (Geddes 
1999; 2003). Although this relationship creates a certain level of stability in a dictatorship, 
Geddes (2003) reasons that a substantial difference in how each treats the opposition exists and 
that this difference makes a single party dictatorship more likely to survive. A single party 
dictatorship, with its party apparatus, can silence the opposition by extending party membership. 
Party membership coalesces the opposition into cooperating with the dictatorship. A personal 
dictatorship, without this party structure, does not coalesce the opposition. Rather, it relies on its 
elites to guard against the opposition, usually with repression. The ability to silence and coopt 
the opposition strengthens the support base and is the reason why a single party dictatorship is 
more likely to survive than a personal dictatorship (Geddes 2003).  
I agree with Geddes (2003) that the way each dictatorship treats the opposition accounts for 
why a single party dictatorship is more likely to survive than a personal dictatorship. However, I 
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believe that Geddes’ (2003) analysis does not take into account an important factor present in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: religion and religious leaders. I advocate for the inclusion of religion and 
religious leaders into a dictatorship survival analysis and seek to add explanatory variables for 
religion and religious leaders into the analysis. 
I proceed in this chapter by showing how the European colonial powers used religion and 
religious leaders to aid in colonial administration. I then show that in the current Sub-Saharan 
African setting, religion remains very important within societies. I will then conclude by 
advocating for the inclusion of religious variables in a dictatorship survival analysis and outline 
the subsequent chapters of this study which seek to show support for how religion affects 
dictatorship survival. 
European Colonization 
To avoid a potential costly conflict between European states, the European rulers carved up 
Africa in the Berlin Conference 1884-1885 (Herbst 2000; Mazuri 2009). After the conference, 
the European colonial powers invested in Africa to secure resources. Each power used religious 
leaders to offer some level of services to the populace – education, healthcare and food (Fage 
2002; Meredith 2005). To access these services, a member of the populace had to be a member 
of the religious organization and follow the religious leader. The Sub-Saharan African learned 
quickly that access to services required adherence to the religious leader who was connected to 
the colonial power (Herbst 2000; Fage 2002; Mazuri 2009). 
British Colonial Rule   
British colonies functioned with a certain level of autonomy; the local administration 
combined British agents and local colonists to administer a colony with the British appointed 
colonial governor having ultimate authority (Meredith 2005; Dowden 2009; Lange 2009). 
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Formal British establishments in its colonies existed on the coast with rails linking to the interior 
for resource extraction. The British governor relied on local coopted officials to manage the 
interior. This structure mirrored Great Britain’s primary concern for its Sub-Saharan African 
colonial interests: resource extraction. With British financial investment focusing on resource 
extraction, the British turned to religious leaders for education, healthcare and general welfare 
(Meredith 2005). During the colonial period, the local populace experienced a government that 
selected certain privileged members of society to maintain power and that relied on religious 
leaders to provide services to the populace (Meredith 2005; Lange 2009). 
Independence 
  After the Second World War, the British needed to devote its finances to rebuilding Great 
Britain. British African colonies had to assume some level of self-supporting governmental 
infrastructure that provided for eventual independence, releasing London from potential colonial 
financial burdens while setting up a commonwealth for the continued association to Great Britain 
to guarantee access to resources (Meredith 2005). To achieve devolution, the British decided to 
transition each of its colonies to a democratic structure over time. Constitutions were to create 
the rules for the new governments and a general timeline whereby powers transferred from the 
British colonial governor to the local Sub-Saharan African government. Elections were to begin 
to fill seats in parliamentary bodies created by the constitutions (Lange 2009). With little to no 
experience with democracy, most emerging leaders in the former British Sub-Saharan African 
colonies used these democratic institutions to consolidate power as single party dictatorships and 
mimic British colonial government (Meredith 2005). In all of these cases, the former colonies 
could neither afford to set up nor provide the services offered by religious leaders. Religious 
leaders retained a substantial societal role post-independence (Meredith 2005). 
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Ghana’s Nkrumah: Prophet or President?  
The Gold Coast, later renamed Ghana, became the first of the colonies to gain independence, 
albeit before the British timetable and expectations. Kwame Nkrumah, a self-declared Marxist 
socialist and staunch anti-imperialist supporter, became the leader of the “Self-Government 
NOW” campaign (Meredith 2005). He became known for being one of the common people, 
frequenting the smallest of villages and sitting on hut floors to gain support for his independence 
movement.  Meredith (2005) explains that: 
To the young, to the homeless ‘verandah boys’ who slept on the verandahs of the wealthy, 
he became an idol, a political magician whose performances generated a sense of 
excitement, of hope, of expectation. His radical appeal spread to trade unionists, ex-
servicemen, clerks, petty traders and primary school teachers, to a new generation, 
frustrated and impatient, seeking a better way of life. To those without money, without 
position, without property, Nkrumah’s call of ‘FreeDom’ was an offer of salvation.  
 
Nkrumah, a baptized Catholic who had callings to become a Jesuit priest, had a consistent 
manner of speech with religious overtones. He offered all salvation: “Seek ye first the political 
kingdom and all else will follow” (Meredith 2005 at 19). Through him and his movement, 
independence meant salvation; politics and religion are one in the same. 
He advocated for boycotts and strikes calling for immediate independence and denounced the 
British government. As his speeches grew more radical, Arden-Clarke, the British governor had 
Nkrumah arrested. This detainment coincided with the first Ghanaian elections. While in prison, 
Nkrumah won a seat in the new parliament. This situation forced the governor to pardon and 
release Nkrumah to avoid a popular uprising (Meredith 2005).    
In parliament, Nkrumah pushed for more local power and a quicker timetable for 
independence. In July 1953, he introduced a bill to parliament for immediate independence 
stating that, “We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquility” (Meredith 2005 
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at 22). The British, although reluctant, granted self-government within a year. Nkrumah’s image 
continued to increase with newspapers equating Nkrumah as having supernatural powers, as 
being a prophet, as being Moses leading Africans to the promised land of independence 
(Meredith 2005). People started to believe Nkrumah to be a deity able to grant miracles 
(Meredith 2005). The Ghana example shows a leader using religious rhetoric and its powers to 
consolidate power over the government to usher in dictatorial rule. 
The Christian Whites of the East 
The British Eastern Sub-Saharan African colonies of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe have the same overall colonial administrative structure and goal of resource 
extraction as those in Western Sub-Saharan Africa with one exception: large amounts of White 
settlers (Meredith 2005). The White settlers felt a duty to educate the Sub-Saharan African in 
Christianity. They showed that access to White privileges, although restricted consistently 
restricted to locals, only came with Christianity (Meredith 2005). These White settlers made the 
importance of Christianity and its religious leaders even stronger than in Western Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
French Colonial Rule  
The French goal in Sub-Saharan Africa starkly contrasted the British goal for resources. The 
French set out to assimilate the colonial Sub-Saharan African into a proper cultural Frenchmen, 
referred to as Frenchification (Chafer 2002). The colonial Sub-Saharan African was to speak 
French, eat baguettes and attend Catholic mass on Sundays (Chafer 2002). The Catholic religion 
and its leaders were directly involved in colonial administration and given a privileged status. To 
access any benefits, being Catholic was a requirement (Chafer 2002).  
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Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the French had created a certain amount of 
“Frenchified” colonists who quickly became privileged members in their respective societies. 
When the Second World War began, these “Frenchified” colonists rallied their societies in 
support of France. In the 1940 battle of France, 24,000 Black West African soldiers fought 
alongside White French soldiers to fend off the Nazi invasion of France (Chafer 2002; Meredith 
2005). After the capitulation of France, The French colonial Sub-Saharan Africans refused to 
surrender and partook in the Allied offensive in Africa and the subsequent invasion of Italy. In 
the eyes of the colonial Africans, they came to the motherland’s aid when France was in dire 
straits and confirmed their allegiance (Meredith 2005). From this war, two Black West Africans 
rose to the forefront as leaders of the French colonies, Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire; both part of the culturally assimilated elite. These men felt 
that the devotion of the Sub-Saharan African colonies to France in World War Two merited 
equality between the two. Senghor, having partaken in the Battle of France and been a prisoner 
in a German concentration camp, felt that the future remained in a closer association with 
France. Houphouet-Boigny believed that no other choice but the continuation of a union with 
France existed. Both denounced Nkrumah as a radical and the British plan for independence of 
its colonies as unfeasible (Meredith 2005).   
As these men advocated for growing equality between France and the Sub-Saharan African 
colonies, the message grew in popularity among the Black West African populace. The initial 
French response devised the Union Francaise whereby no more distinctions between France and 
the Sub-Saharan African colonies existed, rather, “full unity” (Chafer 2002). This unification 
existed only in maps and to appease colonial desires (Meredith 2005). The French feared being 
outnumbered by the Sub-Saharan Africans in government due to the Sub-Saharan Africans’ 
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population size. For this reason, the Union Francaise’s design centered on promulgating unity 
while ensuring White French control over the government in Paris; Sub-Saharan Africans’ seat 
in Parisian government remained disproportionate to population. Feeling betrayed, Senghor and 
Houphouet-Boigny organized protests and demonstrations to fight for true unity. Although the 
protests and demonstrations sometimes became violent, both always reaffirmed their loyalty to 
France and the Union Francaise.  
With a major rebellion in French Indo-China and Algeria and the British colonies movement 
toward independence, The French government feared that the demands for true unity could either 
turn violent or demand independency like the British colonies or both (Meredith 2005).  All 
scenarios overstretched French capabilities to hold its empire intact. The French had already 
began to struggle in Indo-China and Algeria and reducing military capabilities from either to 
Sub-Saharan Africa equated to an almost certain collapse of the empire (Meredith 2005). To 
decisively end the African question, President De Gaulle called for a referendum in the Sub-
Saharan African territories regarding the Union Francaise whereby the territories could either 
decide to remain in a newly organized union or leave. De Gaulle assumed the answer would be 
yes and the question of equality quelled; his message was clear that the new Union would 
function as the old one. He toured the Sub-Saharan African territories to campaign for a “Yes” 
vote and made clear that a “No” vote meant a complete and utter break from France; considered 
blackmail by most (Meredith 2005). 
All Sub-Saharan African territories, except for Guinea, voted overwhelmingly in favor of the 
Union Francaise. Guinea, having voted for immediate independence, received its independence 
along with a cut to all French aid and destruction by the French on departure of as much French 
infrastructure as possible; even light bulbs were repossessed (Meredith 2005).  
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Although the rest of the territories reaffirmed the Union, the referendum did little to 
definitively end Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny from continually demanding more power and 
organizing the masses to demand such power. De Gaulle as well as Senghor and Houphouet-
Boigny realized that no solution existed to appease both sides. With the Algerian revolt having 
grown into a full scale war for independence, De Gaulle needed to direct his attention to that 
matter. For this reason, he granted independence to thirteen new states in 1960, few of which 
were economically viable (Meredith 2005, Dowden 2009). Immediately after granting 
independence, he maneuvered to secure treaties maintaining the benefits of the former colonies 
to remain exclusively in French hands. Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny used their popularity to 
secure rule while reaffirming their commitment with a continued association to Frenchification, 
France and the Catholic religion, allowing this religion and its leaders to retain their privileged 
colonial role in society. In the 1980s, Houphouet-Boigny constructed the largest Catholic basilica 
in the world for these religious leaders to show his acquiescence to their authority (Meredith 
2005). 
Islam in French and British Colonies  
Although Frenchification was France’s goal and leaders such as Senghor and Houphouet-
Boigny embraced Frenchification, this goal was committed mainly to paper due to it being cost 
prohibitive to comprehensively employ throughout the colonial territory (Chafer 2002; Meredith 
2005). Similar to the British, the French made only minor investment into the interior of its 
territories, limiting Frenchification to coastal regions (Chafer 2002). Both the French and British 
relied on Islamic leaders for the administration of the interior (Lange 2009). Before French and 
British colonization, Islamic influences had already pushed south from North Africa into West 
Africa to secure trade and resources. Due to these Islamic groups closing off non-Islamic groups 
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from beneficial commercial trade and funds, the interiors had become heavily Islamic (Fage 
2002). Although The French and British set up colonial services via Christian leaders on the 
coast, both had to rely on Islamic leaders for services and control in the interior. In many cases, 
these Islamic religious leaders both provided access to services and were the official connection 
to the colonial administration (Chafer 2002; Lange 2009).           
Portuguese Colonial Rule    
 The administration of the Portuguese colonies - Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique – 
was haphazard. The Portuguese wished for strong control but lacked the budget to do such. 
Lacking the financial means, the Portuguese government elevated Catholicism and its leaders to 
supply resources and gave it certain official functions while encouraging Portuguese White 
settlement in its colonies, giving the White settlers unfair land privileges (Meredith 2005).   
Independence 
Following British and French colonial independence, Nationalist movements in each 
Portuguese colony began to demand independence (Meredith 2005). Portugal responded by 
denying independence and a full scale war ensued. Catholic leaders provided for the populace 
during the struggle. In 1974, a coup d’état occurred in Portugal and the Portuguese army ceased 
hostilities in Sub-Saharan Africa. These colonies became independent and the leaders of the 
Nationalist movements secured power as head of each respective nationalist movement. These 
nationalist movements became the governing political parties (Meredith 2005). The Portuguese 
example shows an administrative privileged status for Catholic religious leaders as well as 
Catholic religious leaders offering services before independence and during the independence 
struggle.   
Current Sub-Saharan African Religious Attachment 
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Table 1.1 Religious Membership in Sub-Saharan Africa
All of the European colonizers used religion and religious leaders to provide some level of 
services and, in many cases, granted religious leaders governmental roles. Religion during the 
colonial period played an 
important role in the populace’s 
daily life. The European 
colonizers gave Christianity a 
staunch role with the populace 
while elevating, in the French and 
British cases in West Africa, 
interior Islamic religious leaders.  
Using 20 Sub-Saharan African 
countries1 included in the 2008 
Afrobarometer study, Table 1.0 shows that these two religious traditions are the largest in Sub-
                                                          
1 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Saharan Africa. I argue that these two religious traditions and its religious leaders have had and 
do have a role to play in Sub-Saharan African politics.  
Turning to the issue of religious membership in Sub-Saharan Africa, Table 1.1 shows that 
religious membership and affiliation remains strong in present day Sub-Saharan Africa with 67.1 
percent of the populace having some sort of affiliation, 73.3 percent if leaders are included. With 
such a large part of the populace having some sort of membership or affiliation, religion is a 
factor that should not be ignored in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
In addition to religious membership and affiliation among the Sub-Saharan populace, Table 
1.2 shows that Sub-Saharan Africans, even those who claim no level of membership to a 
religion, find religion to be very important in everyday life. This response indicates that the 
majority of the current Sub-Saharan African populace may be highly susceptible to religious 
leaders’ opinions.   
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Given the presence of religious membership and the levels of religiosity in Sub-Saharan 
African society and the presence and importance of religious leaders during the colonial period, I 
argue that the inclusion of religion and religious leaders as explanatory variables offers deeper 
insight into strategies that a dictatorship can use to extend survival. Within these highly religious 
societies, the religious leaders may have a consistent and pervasive sway within their 
communities. This sway can increase a dictatorship’s longevity if the dictatorship coopts 
religious leaders to cultivate support among the religious communities.  
Chapter Outlines2 
To show how religion and religious leaders can affect dictatorship survival, I break down my 
research into 5 subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 2: The Whole Holy Theory 
In Chapter 2, I explain Geddes’ (2003) research on dictatorship survival and argue that by 
excluding religious leaders and their influences from her research, her results do not capture an 
adequate picture of how these dictatorships survive in Sub-Saharan Africa. My claim is that in a 
personal dictatorship, religious leaders are completely excluded whereas in a single party 
dictatorship, religious leaders are included if they pose a credible threat to the dictatorship’s 
stability. These religious leaders garner support among members. By a single party dictatorship 
having the ability to use religious leaders for added support, this type of dictatorship survives 
longer than a personal dictatorship in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Chapter 3: Holy Control: Religious Leaders’ Congregational Control 
In Chapter 3, I begin the analysis by showing that religious leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa 
have control over followers. In order for religious leaders to matter to a dictatorship, they must 
                                                          
2 In all empirical chapters, I rely on SPSS. 
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control followers. Lacking control means that followers do not listen to religious leaders and, 
thus, religious leaders are irrelevant to a dictatorship because they have nothing to offer. 
Chapter 4: Holy Support: Catholic and Islamic Leader and Member Dictatorship Support 
In Chapter 4, I show the connection between respective religious leaders and followers in 
terms of dictatorship support. These religious leaders influence followers and can change levels 
of support for a dictatorship by preaching support for the dictatorship.  
Chapter 5: Holy Survival – Catholic and Islamic Effects on a Dictatorship’s Survival 
In Chapter 5, I show how this support can lead to differing levels of survival between a 
personal dictatorship and a single party dictatorship. Using Geddes’ (2003) research and 
including religious variables into the analysis, I show how religion increases survival likelihood 
for a single party dictatorship. I reason that because a single party dictatorship can include 
religious leaders and because these religious leaders can garner support for the dictatorship 
among followers, single party dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to survive longer. 
Chapter 6: Sacred Dictators 
In Chapter 6, I conclude my study with a synopsis of my findings and an in-depth discussion 
of how my research shows support for my argument. I further explain how my research adds to 
current scholarly research.   
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Chapter 2:  The Whole Holy Argument 
In 1960, Senegal achieved independence from France. Leopold Senghor, as the head of the 
only permitted party in the single party dictatorship, the Parti Socialiste, assumed the role as 
President. Senghor allied himself with the Marabouts, the religious leaders of the dominant 
religion, Islam. To keep their support, Senghor provided the Marabouts with large loans (never 
paid back), and strategically placed development programs. He appointed some into government 
posts and provided the leaders with other material benefits (Meredith 2005; Dowden 2009).  
In 1968, Francisco Macias Nguema became the personal dictator of Equatorial Guinea. 
Nguema, a Catholic, saw a chance of controlling the populace by uniting himself with the 
Catholic Church, the majority religion. He realized that he could use the propaganda of the 
church to exert social control. In order to do so, he paid off select Catholic leaders to replace the 
church’s picture of Jesus with one of himself. Each sermon included a reference to him as, “The 
Only Miracle.” During masses, priests taught congregations spiritual gospel such as, “There is no 
other God than Macias” and “God created Equatorial Guinea thanks to Papa Macias. Without 
Papa Macias, Equatorial Guinea would not exist.” (Meredith 2005 at 241).  
Both examples indicate that a dictatorship can use religious leaders for legitimacy and 
support. The scholarly literature on Sub-Saharan African dictatorship survival has yet to 
recognize religious leaders as potential bases of support. By ignoring religious leaders, the 
literature fails to recognize the potential power that these religious leaders exert over their 
congregations who are the active members of the religion. Religious leaders can rationalize 
decisions made or actions taken by the dictatorship. This rationalization stops congregations 
from questioning the dictatorship’s decisions; the dictatorship, through religious leaders, has the 
means to justify its decisions to congregations. Such support from the masses should equate to 
higher levels of dictatorship survival. 
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I add to the literature by incorporating religious leaders into dictatorship survival and by 
clarifying the connection between religious leaders and dictatorship survival. I proceed by 
offering an in-depth explanation of pertinent literature. Subsequently, I explain my research 
design and how I extend Geddes’ (1999; 2003) survival analysis for a single party and a personal 
dictatorship3 by incorporating a Catholic religious variable previously excluded from her 
analysis and clarifying the Islamic religious variable that she includes. I conclude by explaining 
my expectations and offering areas for future research. 
Literature Review 
Elites and the Dictatorship – A Balancing Act 
The dictatorship survival literature focuses on the relationship between the dictatorship and 
elites (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In order to survive, a dictatorship needs elites to control 
the populace. Scholars find that elite defection leads to the collapse of a dictatorship (Bratton 
1994; Clapham 1996; Dadmehr 2003; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003; Lemarchand 2003; Van 
De Walle 2001; 2004; 2007; Bolton 2007; Bates 2008). 
Geddes’ Model 
Although elite defection explains certain cases of dictatorship failure, exceptions abound. 
Geddes (1999) argues that these exceptions are a sign of poor theoretical foundations. Geddes 
shows that several types of dictatorship exist. She creates a typology based on the different 
groups and segments within a society that a dictatorship coopts as elites, such as friends, family 
and the military.  
                                                          
3 Geddes (1999; 2003) also has categories for military and amalgams; amalgams are mixtures of her categories. I 
focus on personal and single party because they are the most prevalent in Africa. No military regimes exist during 
the period of interest, 1990-2009. I also exclude amalgams because only three exist in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Personal and Single Party Dictatorships and Survival 
Within Geddes’ typology,4 personal and single party dictatorships make up 56 and 32 percent 
of Sub-Saharan African dictatorships, respectively.5 A personal dictatorship has one individual 
who acts as the central authority figure for the government. In this type of dictatorship, the elite 
are family and friends of the dictator and the military (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Geddes 
1999; Ezrow and Frantz 2011). The relationship between the dictator and the elite becomes 
subject to the will of the dictator; status as part of the elite is more exclusive and closed (Geddes 
1999; Ezrow and Frantz 2011).6 With regard to the distribution of patronage7 and its effects on 
dictatorship survival, Geddes (2003) further clarifies the relationship between this dictatorship 
type, its elites and the opposition. She argues that personal dictators consolidate all power in 
their hands. The decision as to who becomes part of the elite and thus receives patronage is a 
tactical decision. A personal dictatorship looks for elites that provide strong support - the ones 
who best aid survival: the military, family and friends. The dictatorship incorporates these elites, 
and the fate of both becomes the same: elites’ benefits stop if the dictatorship does not survive, 
                                                          
4 Friedrich and Brzezinski (1950), Arendt (1968), Huntington and Moore (1970), Linz (2000), Levitsky and Way 
(2002) all offer some form of classification for dictatorships. I rely on Geddes (1999) because she encompasses 
these other classifications while offering a clearer means to test my argument.  
5 I use the GWF data for 2009. Geddes offers two other categories, military and monarchy that have no cases in Sub-
Saharan Africa. She also includes a category for Amalgams which is a type of dictatorship that combines two of her 
four categories. Three cases of Amalgams exist but I focus on personal and single party, as they are the two main 
types in Africa. 
6 Wintrobe (1998) contends that personal dictators exhibit a certain level of paranoia. Such paranoia causes elites to 
worry about their status in the inner circle. To maintain such a status, these elites must provide the dictator with a 
requisite amount of support to keep the citizens at bay or face replacement (Wintrobe 1998). Heightened paranoia on 
the part of the dictator causes the dictator to worry consistently about how to remain in power. This conundrum, 
referred to as the dictator’s dilemma, consists of two option for the dictator: repression and loyalty (Wintrobe 1998). 
Either option potentially generates negative externalities for the dictator. Repression may lead to general discontent 
sufficient to overthrow the dictator, and loyalty only lasts as long as the dictator can maintain it. Lacking predictable 
outcomes, a personal dictator’s paranoiac behavior may affect his survival; elites may become too fearful that their 
position is untenable and revolt, or citizens may react to repression or a combination of both (Wintrobe 1998). Other 
scholars have found that this paranoia does not necessarily translate into elites being consistently worried. Magaloni 
(2008) reasons that if the elites loyal to the dictator are in a constant state of worry about their status, the dictator is 
in a constant threat of being overthrown; he has to trust someone and make some sort of credible commitment to his 
elites and, in turn, the elites to him by offering protection from the citizens. I am acknowledging this distinction but 
find that Magaloni (2008) has a more consistent approach with the literature. 
7 Patronage is the pay-off, be it cash or appointment to an office from the dictatorship to the elites.  
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and the dictatorship does not survive if the elites withdraw support (Bratton and Van de Walle 
1997). Therefore, the dictatorship and the elites have a mutually vested interest in working 
together against all others to ensure survival. With patronage, in most instances being finite, it 
behooves a personal dictatorship to include the minimum winning coalition of elites; keeping the 
elites’ size small more likely guarantees consistent and significantly larger patronage distribution 
than a larger more spread out coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Geddes 2003). 
Moreover, a smaller coalition is more manageable (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Geddes 
2003). The dictatorship hoards patronage to distribute to the minimum winning coalition of 
elites; the dictatorship’s best survival chance requires such hoarding.8  
  The single party dictatorship has an institutional party structure and is not completely 
subject to the whim of one individual.9 It has one majority party for the administration of the 
dictatorship, with the president being the head of the party. Party members are the elites, 
typically with some governing council or ministers being the core group of elites. The 
institutional nature of the party provides a clear means for elites to see that cooperation with the 
dictatorship has measurable benefits; elites can rise within the party (Geddes 1999; 2003; Ezrow 
and Frantz 2011). A single party dictatorship is also more inclusive: party membership remains 
more open, regardless of tribe, ethnicity, or socio-economic background (Geddes 1999; Ezrow 
and Frantz 2011).10 Due to this structure, an appreciable difference exists in the treatment of the 
opposition. Geddes (2003) reasons that party members, like democratic counterparts, are 
                                                          
8 Geddes (2003) also says that some patronage can go to the opposition but it is usually very slight, if it happens at 
all. The focal point is on elites and patronage to such elites forcing these regimes to hoard resources for these elites.  
9 Geddes (2003) does not exclude personal dictatorships that have a party apparatus. Many personal dictatorships do, 
but the difference between this party apparatus and the single party dictatorships is the control over policy and 
distribution of state resources. In personal dictatorships, the dictator is the person in control of policy, whereas in 
single party dictatorships, the party elites control policy (Geddes 2003). 
10 This openness does not mean that anyone can join the party but rather that extension of membership does not 
necessarily coincide with tribe, ethnicity or socio-economic background. Frequently in a personal dictatorship 
regime, the personal dictator coopts, as elites, people of similar background to him, hence the differentiation 
between the two. 
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concerned with retaining office. She notes that, “Some value office because they want to control 
policy, some for the pure enjoyment of influence and power and some for the illicit material 
gains that come with office” (Geddes 2003 at 58-59). She shows the interactions between both 
party members and opposition. If the opposition has potential to threaten the dictatorship, this 
type of dictatorship can silence the opposition by having the opposition join the party and share 
in the patronage.11 
Therefore, a theoretical difference and expectation exists with respect to the distribution of 
patronage. The opposition, in a personal dictatorship, receives no patronage because personal 
dictatorships, to maximize survival, incorporate the dictator’s friends and family and the military 
as elites and rely on oppression of the opposition (Geddes 2003). In a single party dictatorship, 
the party offers the opposition, if it poses a credible threat, patronage for compliance and silence 
(Geddes 2003). Due to this difference, Geddes (2003) finds that a single party dictatorship 
survives longer, on average, than a personal dictatorship. 
Issues that Affect Dictatorship Survival – Geddes’ Control Variables 
Economy and Dictatorships 
Geddes (2003) arrives at this conclusion but acknowledges that each dictatorship may have 
unique country level factors that may affect her general finding. When a dictatorship plunders 
the economy to maintain the patronage payments to the point of an economic meltdown, such a 
meltdown forces a dictatorship to renege on payments; the coffers are drained. Without 
                                                          
11 Geddes (2003) argues that the patronage to buy off the opposition is generally inferior to patronage for party 
elites, but that is better than no patronage. By receiving something, the opposition’s continued patronage becomes 
intermingled with the dictatorship’s survival; refusing to cooperate places the opposition in a worse situation than 
cooperating because the opposition loses all patronage. With both the party and opposition being better off with the 
dictatorship’s survival, both cooperate to ensure such survival.  
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consistent payments, the dictatorship destabilizes, and elites challenge the dictatorship (Bratton 
and Van De Walle 1997, Geddes 2003). 
Natural Resources and Dictatorship Survival 
A dictatorship that has significant oil or mineral wealth has a consistent stream of revenue, 
albeit dependent on price fluctuations, to use for patronage (Ross 2001; Bannon and Collier 
2003; Dunning 2008). The dictatorship may use such a revenue stream to maintain the patronage 
structure, even in times of crisis, where a dictatorship without such revenue cannot. Therefore, 
natural resources increase a dictatorship’s survival for the states with such natural resource 
wealth by such states being more likely to avoid elites’ schisms because the patronage payment 
structure is more assured (Ross 2001; Dunning 2008; Escriba-Folch 2012). A dictatorship with 
natural resources should survive longer than counterparts without. Scholars have also viewed this 
revenue stream as having the opposite effect and creating a resource curse (Collier and Hoeffler 
2002; Ross 2006). According to the resource curse, control over the revenue stream from the 
resources becomes a point of contention and leads to the potential for unending conflict between 
societal groups. The effects of natural resources for dictatorship survival are murky.  
Islam 
In addition to economic performance and natural resources, some scholars have found that 
the Islamic religion has certain attributes that make democracy difficult in areas where there is a 
large percentage of the population following this religion (Ross 2001). There might also be 
something in this religion’s structure that supports a dictatorship (Geddes 2003). Geddes reasons 
that this religion places high importance on a hierarchical structure and that members become 
accustomed to accepting as fact edicts given from those in power; Muslims are less likely to 
question the dictatorship. These relationships purported by scholars remain questionable and 
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unclear, but nonetheless to be through, Geddes (2003) controls for the percentage of the Muslim 
populace. 
Summary of Geddes’ Model 
When controlling for presence of natural resources, economic performance and Islam, 
Geddes (2003) finds that a single party dictatorship survives longer than a personal dictatorship. 
She reasons that this difference occurs due to how each treats the opposition; a single party 
dictatorship can buy off the opposition whereas a personal dictatorship cannot. A personal 
dictatorship’s survival depends on maintaining the minimum winning coalition of elites to the 
exclusion of all others; no mechanism exists for the opposition to be coalesced into the 
dictatorship.  
Literature Review of Issues Not Present in Geddes’ Analysis 
With my research focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, other factors specific to this region can 
play a part in a dictatorship survival analysis. 
Ethnicity or Religion – One and the Same? 
Scholars frequently include religion as part of ethnicity. A debate exists regarding the 
relationship between ethnicity and religion. Horowitz (1985) defines ethnicity as a sense of 
collective belonging stemming from a common history, culture, language, race and religious 
tradition. Gellner (1983) furthers this definition by equating nation to the combination of 
ethnicity and statehood. This view of ethnicity runs contrary to conditions in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The European powers carved up Sub-Saharan Africa with little concern for demography 
(Herbst 1989, 2000; Young 2009). Upon independence, states in Sub-Saharan Africa had little 
ethnic cohesion. For this reason, scholars have turned to fragmented ethnicity to explain 
problems from conflict to failed democracies (Horowitz 1985; Berman 2004; Meredith 2005; 
21 
 
Young 2009). Other scholars have argued that ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa never existed 
before the European colonization but was a European creation to use for political control (Bayart 
1993; Englebert 2000; LeVine 2007). As a European invention, ethnicity became initially salient 
after independence when states were trying to formulate an identity, and power struggles after 
independence caused leaders to exacerbate the imaginary differences (Anderson 1983; Englebert 
2000; Severino and Ray 2011).  
Posner (2006) notes that if ethnicity were once an issue, leaders can bring it back to the 
forefront when needed. He shows that ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa is a fluid association for 
an individual. The importance an individual places on ethnicity changes based on which ethnic 
identity brings the most benefits; in Posner’s (2006) study, an individual placed different 
importance on certain ethnic identities depending if the question was local or national. Posner 
finds that an individual may find a tribal identity important in a local election but find a linguistic 
identity more important in a national election.  
From this standpoint, a dictatorship would use religious leaders over ethnic ones because 
religion is something that individuals do not part with as easily as an identity; it is less fluid 
(Englebert 2000). Religion also provides a means to cross cut tribal and ethnic cleavages; two 
individuals may be part of different tribes, different language groups and different cultural 
backgrounds but have the same religion (Jelen and Wilcox 2002). For this reason, the 
incorporation of religious leaders over ethnic leaders is a more assured means to measure the 
intended benefit and outcome for a dictatorship.12 
Religious Leaders’ Political Power 
                                                          
12 The Pearson correlation estimate of .182 comparing the Quality of Governance’s ethno-linguistic and religious 
fractionalization variables for Sub-Saharan Africa indicates that no significant relationship exists between the two. 
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Huntington (1996) finds that religious leaders can mobilize a society. With religion being a 
mobilizing factor, religious leaders, as elites, can affect dictatorship survival. The Iranian 
revolution shows religious leaders leading a popular uprising and achieving an Islamic state 
(Siavoshi 2002). In the United States, religious leaders have increasing influence in politics and 
elections (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011; Wilcox and Robinson 2011). 
Religious authorities have the ability to either contest or accommodate changes in society. 
Religious leaders can react to a moral shift in society depending on how the shift threatens the 
religious authorities (Casanova 1994). If a moral change in society elevates religious authorities’ 
status, religious leaders can advocate for the change and aid in its political legitimacy by 
encouraging congregational acceptance (Moen and Gustafson 1992). If the societal change 
threatens religious authorities’ status, the religious leaders can motivate congregations to oppose 
the change (Horowitz 1985). We see an example of this situation in the United States with 
marriage being extended to same-sex couples. Religious leaders, whose doctrine supported this 
change, preached acceptance to congregations and aided in the legitimacy of the law. 
Conversely, other religious leaders, whose doctrine opposed a change in marriage, mobilized 
congregations to oppose the change. 
Catholicism and a Differing View on Islam than Geddes 
Englebert (2000) argues that Roman Catholicism and Islam are the only religions with a 
strong hierarchical structure. With such a strong hierarchical structure, a dictatorship need only 
give patronage to the head religious leaders to gain the support of the entire congregational 
religious base. These head religious leaders mandate compliance from other subordinate 
religious leaders. Lacking such a hierarchy makes religious leaders and the support from their 
congregations more costly; patronage has to go to every religious leader and not just the head 
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leader. Therefore, Catholic and Islamic religious leaders’ patronage costs less and provides 
higher benefits for a dictatorship than other religions and their religious leaders.  
Research Design – The Addition of Religion to Geddes’ Model  
The literature shows that religious authority has a role to play in politics in general; yet, 
Geddes’ model on dictatorship survival ignores Catholicism and inaccurately uses Islam as a 
control variable. I agree with Geddes’ (2003) findings that a single party dictatorship survives 
longer than a personal dictatorship due to differences in how each treats the opposition. I part 
with Geddes (2003) and argue for the addition of Catholic as independent variables and moving 
Islam from being a control variable to an independent variable. I hypothesize that religious 
leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa can affect dictatorship survival.  
To provide support for the inclusion of religion as an independent variable, I break down my 
argument into three vital steps. The first and second steps rely on individual level data, and the 
third step relies on the data from the aggregate level. With this topic being new to the debate, I 
begin my analysis of religious leaders by showing how and why they are attractive to a 
dictatorship. 
Step 1: For Participation in a Dictatorship, A Religious Leader must have Congregational 
Control13 
In order for a dictatorship to consider religious leaders as useful for survival, the religious 
leaders must exhibit control over the respective congregations. Without congregational control, 
religious leaders serve no purpose to the dictatorship; a dictatorship’s interest in religious leaders 
is to gain congregational support. If religious leaders cannot generate support, a dictatorship 
paying off religious leaders is a waste of resources and, therefore, irrational. Thus, the first step 
                                                          
13 In the Appendices for Chapter 2, two tables, created using the World Values Survey 2005-2008, offer a 
comparison of Sub-Saharan Africa to other world regions in terms of importance of god in an individual’s daily life 
and membership levels for religious organizations. 
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in my argument is to show that religious leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa have control, albeit at 
varying levels, over their congregations. 
To do this, I rely on secularization theory. This theory states that an inverse relationship 
between development and religious leaders’ congregational control exists. This theory does not 
base its argument on religion disappearing or on self-identified religiosity changing (Martin 
1978; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Rather, it looks at how a religious leader’s control over an 
individual member changes with development (Norris and Inglehart 2004). To measure 
development, scholars generally look at individuals’ level of survival security in terms of access 
to goods such as food (Taylor 2007). At low levels of development, individuals rely on religious 
leaders to provide security - access to food. In order to maintain such access, individuals must 
listen to religious leaders; these leaders have the power to deny access. Therefore, an expectation 
exists that at the lowest levels of development, religious leaders have the highest amount of 
control over individuals. As development increases, wealth increases and individuals do not 
necessarily have to rely on religious leaders for survival security: the increase in wealth increases 
individuals’ access to food. This increase in wealth also creates a middle class. This middle class 
makes demands on the state to supply for individuals’ security needs. The state acquiesces to the 
demands of the middle class and provides more for the daily life of its citizens (Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). As the state begins and continues to provide for its citizens, the state begins to 
supplant the role of providing services once monopolized by religious leaders (Chavez 1994; 
Hoffman 1998). As development continues to increase, congregations listen less to religious 
leaders because the congregations do not have to rely on religious leaders for access to security 
needs (Taylor 2007). 
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To test this step, I rely on the Afrobarometer’s individual level survey data.14 For my 
independent variable, I look at an individual’s level of food security. My dependent variable is 
how often an individual contacted a religious leader about a personal issue. Because my 
dependent variable is ordinal, I run an ordered logistical regression (Long 1997). I expect to see, 
in accordance with secularization theory, as an individual’s food insecurity decreases, the 
individual contacts a religious leader less frequently. 
Table 2.0  Religious Breakdown 
 Personal Dictatorships Single Party Dictatorships 
Country 
 
 
Catholics 
 
Muslims 
Burkina 
Faso 
 
9% 
 
43% 
 
Cameroon 
 
 
35% 
 
22% 
 
Cote 
D’Ivoire 
 
18.5% 
 
24% 
 
 
Togo 
 
 
29.3% 
 
17% 
 
 
Uganda 
 
 
49.6% 
 
6.6% 
 
 
Mozambique 
 
 
31.4% 
 
13% 
 
 
Tanzania 
 
 
28.2% 
 
32.5% 
 
 
Zambia 
 
 
26.2% 
 
.3% 
 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
14.4% 
 
.9% 
Step 2: Religious Leaders’ Support for the Dictatorship 
If religious leaders have some level of control over congregations, religious leaders can 
provide congregational support for a dictatorship. To maximize survival, dictatorships, be they 
single party or personal, rely on a minimum winning coalition of elite. For a religious leader to 
be included in this minimum winning coalition, I would expect that this religious leader’s 
influence encompasses nearly all of the country. Without such a level of influence, a 
dictatorship’s decision to include one religious leader to the exclusion of others risks alienating 
religious leaders who are left out. These excluded religious leaders can convince congregations 
to oppose the dictatorship. This situation does not provide the added stability sought by a 
dictatorship when choosing to incorporate religious leader elites. For this reason, I view this type 
of decision as irrational for a dictatorship; the costs outweigh the benefits. A dictatorship, whose 
religious leader does not have influence on almost all of the country, is better off excluding all 
                                                          
14 Afrobarometer Data, Round 4, 2006-2008, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org. 
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the religious leaders. By doing such, a dictatorship’s minimum winning coalition is smaller and 
the outcome for survival clearer.  
The literature further indicates that a personal dictatorship, when feeling threatened, does not 
offer patronage to the opposition, whereas a single party dictatorship, with the party apparatus, 
does. Within the countries sampled in the Afrobarometer, none have a religious group that is all 
encompassing. I assume that neither a personal dictatorship nor a single party dictatorship in my 
sample includes religious leaders as elites – it is irrational due to the congregational sizes. With 
Geddes’ noting the difference that only a single party dictatorship is able to offer something to 
the opposition if it feels threatened, I built my analysis off of this difference. I reason that single 
party dictatorships do buy-off some religious leaders, who are in the opposition, if they feel 
threatened or if they want additional support. For this reason, I expect that I will only see a 
statistically significant relationship in a single party dictatorship between religious leaders and 
likelihood of dictatorship approval. I, therefore, expect to see that if a religious leader supports 
the dictatorship, the respective congregation will also show a statistically significant level of 
support for the dictatorship. I am not challenging the literature, rather, using it to create the 
expectations for this step in my analysis. 
To show such a relationship, I rely on the merged Afrobarometer’s individual level survey 
data. My dependent variable of interest throughout this step is a dichotomous variable of whether 
or not an individual unequivocally supports the dictatorship’s political party. Because the 
dependent variable is dichotomous, I run binary logistical regressions. To ascertain the position 
of religious leaders, I first recode the data to create a set of four independent variables for 
religious leaders depending on religion and type of dictatorship in which the religious leader 
resides. These independent variables of interest are: Catholic Religious Leaders in a Single Party 
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Dictatorship, Islamic Religious Leaders in a Single Party Dictatorship, Catholic Religious 
Leaders in a Personal Dictatorship, and Islamic Religious Leaders in a Personal Dictatorship. I 
expect to see that religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are more likely to support the 
dictatorship than counterparts in a personal dictatorship; religious leaders are in the opposition in 
both type of dictatorships but only a single party dictatorship can coopt religious leaders in the 
opposition. Therefore, these religious leaders in a single party dictatorship should be more likely 
to support the dictatorship. Part of the bargain is for the religious leaders in a single party 
dictatorship to garner support from congregations. I now recode the same data to create similar 
independent variables of interest to see if the congregations react. These variables are Catholic 
Members in a Single Party Dictatorship, Islamic Members in a Single Party Dictatorship, 
Catholic Members in a Personal Dictatorship and Islamic Members in a Personal Dictatorship. I 
rerun the binary logistical regression to see if the congregations react with higher support. I 
expect to see that Catholic and Islamic Members in a Single Party Dictatorship are more likely to 
support the dictatorship than counterparts in a personal dictatorship; religious leaders in a single 
party are coopted to gain such support.  
Step 3: Dictatorship Survival with Religion Included 
In this step, I show the effects of religious leaders garnering support amongst their 
congregations. I add the percentage of Catholics and Muslims as respective independent 
variables to Geddes’ survival model. I expect to see that single party dictatorships have higher 
survival likelihood than personal dictatorships - this expectation comes directly from the 
literature (Geddes 1999, 2003)– and that single party dictatorships with sizable religious factions 
have even higher survival likelihood, which is the effect of religious leaders’ garnering 
congregational support for the dictatorship in exchange for patronage from the dictatorship.   
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Conclusion  
Personal and single party dictatorships have substantial differences in how each treats the 
opposition due to how each maximizes survival. A personal dictatorship maximizes survival by 
keeping the elites’ size small and hoarding patronage for distribution to this group, whereas a 
single party dictatorship offers inferior patronage to the opposition. This difference in patronage 
to the religious leaders in the opposition should affect survival rates. With a single party 
dictatorship more likely to share some level of patronage with religious leaders in the opposition, 
such difference in patronage creates religious leaders that are more likely to be supportive of the 
dictatorship and preach such to congregations. The congregations react with a higher likelihood 
of support. With a single party dictatorship having a higher likelihood of populace support than a 
personal dictatorship, this difference in support translates into a difference in dictatorship 
survival; a single party dictatorship has a higher likelihood of survival than a personal 
dictatorship.  
This argument has many opportunities for future research. In order to begin the discussion of 
religious leaders in a dictatorship, I have had to exclude how religious leaders help when a 
dictatorship faces exogenous shocks. This situation could further clarify how the survival 
likelihood changes due to how the religious leaders act to insulate a dictatorship from the ill 
effects of such shocks. The effects of religious leaders in the decision to use repression offer an 
additional area for further research. Plausibly, religious leaders make the use of repression less 
attractive when a dictatorship can merely use the power of preaching to exert social control. In 
addition to these areas of future research, field research strengthening the patronage connection 
or ascertaining how the preaching occurs to congregations would be highly beneficial to the 
study of how dictatorships use religious leaders to increase survival.  
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Chapter 3: Holy Control: Religious Leaders’ Congregational Control 
A dictatorship maximizes its survival by incorporating elites to guard against challenges to 
its legitimacy. The decision of who becomes part of the elites and who is excluded – thus 
becoming opposition – is a tactical decision on the part of the dictatorship depending on its cost-
benefit analysis (Geddes 1999, 2003). Single party and personal dictatorships, in order to 
maximize survival, seek to extend patronage to elites who offer the highest benefits of protection 
compared to the relative costs of maintaining those elites. Religious leaders, if they possess a 
large enough congregation15, can aid the dictatorship by preaching support and compliance. Yet, 
I reason that given a dictatorship’s limited resources and few religions having strong 
congregational sizes in Sub-Saharan Africa, a dictatorship maximizes survival by focusing on 
more appropriate elites such as the military and wealthy; religious leaders are in the opposition. 
As members of the opposition, Geddes (2003) notes the differences in how each type of 
dictatorship treats the opposition: personal dictatorships hoard resources to make payments to 
elites and exclude the opposition, whereas single party dictatorships can offer inferior patronage 
to silence the opposition if the single party dictatorship feels threatened. This difference creates 
an expectation that religious leaders, who are in the opposition, are treated differently in both 
types of dictatorship. A personal dictatorship focuses on excluding religious leaders whereas a 
single party dictatorship offers patronage to religious leaders whose congregational size may 
pose a threat to stability in exchange for support from  the religious leaders. 
For both a single party or a personal dictatorship to include religious leaders, the dictatorship 
must see a clear benefit offered by religious leaders. In order for religious leaders to be of 
interest in the cost-benefit analysis of either dictatorship, these leaders must have control over 
                                                          
15 When I refer to congregation, I am referring to active membership. I use both terms interchangeably.  
30 
 
their congregations; lacking control makes the incorpration of religious leaders irrelevent 
because they cannot supply congregational support to either type of dictatorship if the 
congregation does not defer to such religious leaders’ authority. 
To establish the likelihood of religious leaders’ authority over congregations, secularization 
theory scholars find that a relationship between individual level survival security and religious 
authority exists; as individual level survival secruity increases due to development and 
industrialization, religious leaders’ authority diminshes (Chaves 1994; Norris and Inglehart 
2004; Taylor 2007). Thus, the precusory assumption to secularization theory is that in countries 
with low levels of development, insufficient to spur industrialization, religious leaders have 
strong authority over congregations (Martin 1978). Using the HDI index16 to compare 
development, Table 3.0 shows that Sub-Saharan Africa is the least developed region in the 
world. When looking at Sub-Saharan African dictatorships, these dictatorships are among the 
least developed overall in the world.17 The countries in my sample, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda have HDI scores of  .306, .322, .345, .414, .420, and 
.437, respectively. With the least developed being considered as having a score of .457 or less, these 
countries are at extremely low levels of development.  Therefore, secularization theory, with its 
assumption of development triggering a change in religious leaders’ congregational control, 
expects that religious leaders, in these countries, have sufficient congregational control to be of 
interest to any dictatorship’s cost-benefit analysis. 
                                                          
16 The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions 
of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living and is 
frequently used to look at development levels (United Nations 2008). 
17 For comparison purposes to other pertinent dictatorships: the scores for Cuba, Saudi Arabia, China and Myanmar 
are .830, .791, .682 and .500, respectively. The average HDI score for a dictatorship outside of Africa is .703.  
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Least Development: .457
Average Development: .587
Highest Developement: .879
Table 3.0: Human Development Index 2008
 In this chapter, I argue that religious leaders do have control over congregations and are of 
interest to a dictatorship to garner congregational support with which dictatorship survival 
increases. I proceed in this chapter with a literature review on secularization theory. After the 
literature review, I outline my hypotheses and explain both the operationalization of my variables 
and  my methods for testing my hypotheses. I then report my results and discuss the implications. 
After explaing my results, I address an alternative argument - religious market theory. I conclude 
this chapter by explaining how the results support my overall argument and discuss possibilities 
for future research. 
Literature Review 
For centuries, Christianity played an important role in the politics of Western civilizations 
(Martin 1978). Christian religious leaders aided the populace by providing educational, health 
and welfare services (Martin 1978). To access such services, religious leaders required a certain 
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level of devotion and deference to their authority from the populace. Lacking any alternative for 
these services, individuals’ survival often depended on  religious leaders’ services. Failing to 
provide religious leaders with the required deference barred individuals from such services, 
lowering individuals’ survival likelihood. Religious leaders’ monopoly on these services, 
therefore, resulted in a strong level of societal control due to individuals wanting to maximize 
survival (Martin 1978). 
Martin (1978) noted a decline in Christian religious leaders’ authority among industrialized 
states. Martin argues that industrialization is the necessary precursor to a decline in religious 
leaders’ control.18 The reason attributed to the decline in Christian religious leaders’ 
congregational control focuses on industrialization leading to apathy among the populace. 
Industrialization creates a strong middle class who demand inclusion within politics. As this 
middle class becomes more included in politics, services formerly monopolized by religious 
leaders, such as health, education and welfare, develop as governmental entities to guarantee 
access to such services by all. As a result of these religious leaders’ monopoly on such services 
transferring to the state, the populace has less connection to religious leaders for survival and 
becomes apathetic toward such leaders’ opinions; the populace does not have to acquiesce to 
religious leaders’ opinions to access these secular services, so religious leaders’ opinion matters 
less. This apathy, therefore, accounts for a decline in religious leaders’ control in that individuals 
become uninterested in religious leaders’ opinion. 
Wallis and Bruce (1992) clarify Martin’s (1978) proposition regarding the connection 
between industrialization and a more secular society. These scholars attribute religious leaders’ 
loss of congregational control to three facets that stem from industrialization: social 
                                                          
18 Martin’s (1978) original work on secularization theory stems from Huntington’s (1968) modernization theory and 
is a clarification on what happens to religious authority based on modernization theory. 
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differentiation, societalization and rationalization. Social differentiation bases the explanation on 
the change in institutions, rather than services that affect the roles previously fulfilled by 
religious leaders and is the closest facet to Martin’s (1978) original secularization theory (Wallis 
and Bruce 1992). They reason that industrialization provides public schools and hospitals, 
previously monopolized by religious organizations. By supplanting religious organizations’ 
monopoly, individuals have less need for religious leaders. Consequently, the religious leaders’ 
congregational control diminishes due to a public institutional option.  
Societalization turns to demographic changes produced by industrialization as a potential 
explanation (Wallis and Bruce 1992). According to societalization19, industrialization’s large 
factories draw individuals from diverse religious backgrounds into close proximity with each 
other. As these individuals socialize, they want to become a part of this greater society and 
subsequently assimilate rather than remain secluded in religious enclaves. As individuals’ 
attention centers on becoming part of the society as a whole, religion becomes less salient for the 
individuals. With saliency of religion diminishing, religious leaders lose control of congregations 
(Wallis and Bruce 1992). 
Giorgi (1992) focuses on what attribute of societalization leads to apathy and, thus, to 
secularization by accounting for all differing levels of personal belief using the European Values 
Survey. Employing church attendance, self-assessed religiosity, doctrinal orthodoxy and 
devotionalism as dependent variables and dividing the sample into religious groups to account 
for certain cultural and political factors, she confirms Martin’s (1978) theory that religious 
institutions decline; thus religious leaders’ control declines. Although this study confirms the 
overall effect of industrialization and societalization, Giorgi (1992) contends that an appropriate 
measure must separate the individual’s religiosity and the decline of religious institutions; 
                                                          
19 This term refers to diverse groups coming into close proximity with each other. 
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although religious institutions decline, personal religious beliefs remain a function of culture and 
may plausibly change due to cultural influences. 
On par with Giorgi (1992), McLeod (1992) advocates for a micro-level approach to the 
effects of societalization on a decline in religious leaders’ control. If industrialization occurs in 
major urban centers, these centers become a vital means to test the effects of industrialization on 
religious authority. Examining New York, London and Berlin, McLeod (1992) finds that within 
these cities, secularization occurs as a direct reaction to the historical, political and demographic 
changes to the city. This finding shows that urban centers show a decline in religiosity in 
concurrence with the idea of societalization; as the diverse society becomes more intertwined, 
religion loses its place as means for community involvement. 
Rationalization differs from societalization and social differentiation in that it links 
industrialization and security to a decline in religious leaders’ congregational control. 
Industrialization creates jobs. Jobs need employees. Employees work these jobs for a wage. This 
wage allows individuals to fulfill the basic security needs. As individuals become more secure, 
individuals’ rationalization for the need of an intervening God lessens; individuals who are 
secure, no longer turn to religious leaders to explain their low levels of security. Therefore, high 
individual level security weakens religious leaders’ control by making the will of God as an 
explanation to insecurity irrelevant (Wallis and Bruce 1992). 
 Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that economic development and growth encompass the 
three facets of secularization theory: social differentiation, societalization and rationalization. 
They merge all prior scholarly thought regarding secularization theory and religious leaders’ 
control into terms of a shift in economic growth and development as the appropriate 
measurement to account for a change in religious authority. According to these scholars, an 
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increase in economic growth and development provides an increase in individuals’ survival 
security. As growth and development continue, all individuals’ security concerns decrease. As 
individuals become more secure, religious authority decreases; the void in individuals’ survival 
security previously fulfilled by religious leaders becomes supplanted by the security provided by 
economic growth and development.  
Hirschle (2010) refines the economic growth and development argument of Norris and 
Inglehart (2004). He argues that deference to religious authority is a learned behavior during 
formative years. Once formed, this level of attachment follows individuals throughout their 
lifetime. Therefore, different generational cohorts react to religious authority depending on the 
economic growth and development during their formative years and continue such deference 
during the course of their lifetime. This attachment in the formative years to religious leaders’ 
authority follows individuals regardless of what economic shifts occur after the formative years 
(Hoffman 1998). 
From the economic growth and development argument, other scholars clarify how to 
measure religious leaders’ control (Chaves 1994, Taylor 2007). Previous scholars equate 
religious service attendance to religious leaders’ control, assuming that attendance is indicative 
of control (Chaves 1994). Chaves (1994) argues that the appropriate focal point is on the change 
in trust of religious authority to show a change in religious leaders’ control over congregations. 
By focusing on the change in trust, secularization theory becomes distinguishable from 
individuals’ personal beliefs and spirituality; the theory does not claim a change in personal 
beliefs and spirituality but rather that religious leaders’ control declines. Klieman and Ramsey 
(1996) support Chaves’ (1994) argument by finding that confidence in religious leaders 
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decreases while religious attendance increases; merely attending services does not make 
religious leaders have control. 
Although secularization theory proponents find support for a connection between economic 
development and religious leaders’ authority, other scholars prefer a competing theory known as 
religious market theory. According to religious market theory, religious leaders compete for 
congregations (Stark 1997). To attract members and maintain membership, these religious 
leaders use incentives to keep and attract new membership (Stark 1997). The more religons 
present in a society, the higher the competition and the better the incentives. To continue to 
receive the incentives, individuals must listen and defer to religious leaders (Norris and Inglehart 
2004). With this incentive structure, this theory assumes that religiously plural societies have 
religious leaders with strong congregational control. Although plausible, this theory does not 
explain where the religious leaders gain the resources to offer continuous incentives.  
Hypotheses 
Merging all of these scholars’ refinement, secularization theory purports that high levels of 
economic growth and development equate to a substantial loss of religious authorities’ control 
over congregations; this congregational control continues to diminish on par with economic 
development and growth. Yet, I presented evidence at the beginning of this chapter that 
development is slight, at best. Therefore, I am arguing that, in my sample, religious leaders have 
control over congregations because they are providing individuals with survival security. To 
determine if I am correct, I look for support for secularization theory.  
Scholars have approached an analysis of secularization theory by looking at changes in 
individual level survival security (Micro-Level), shifting demographics, industrialization and 
cultural issues (Macro-Level), as well as overall development (Macro-Level). To clarify if 
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secularization theory’s expectations occur in my sample, I create hypotheses to do a multi-level 
analysis on factors that affect religious leaders’ authority. For the micro-level analysis, I look at 
individual countries and posit that:   
H1: In each country, as an individual’s food insecurity increases, an individual is likely to 
contact a religious leader more often. 
 
By turning to a religious leader for help, the individual displays a level of trust in the religious 
leader sufficient to lend support to the idea that the religious leader has a certain level of control 
over the individual (Chaves 1994). 
Georgi (1992) notes that, in certain societies, culture and religion intertwine to the point 
where they are one in the same; the culture is the religion and the religion is the culture. These 
societies grant a certain amount of authority to religious leaders. Wallace and Bruce (1992) and 
McLeod (1992) show support for demographic shifts and differences in industrialization 
affecting religious leaders’ authority. To test these scholars’ findings, I posit that in the macro-
environment: 
H2: A country has unique attributes that affect the frequency of an individual contacting a 
religious leader. 
 
If these scholars are correct and culture, demographic shifts and differing levels of 
industrialization affect religious leaders’ authority, I expect to see that country dichotomous 
variables show significance in the analysis. 
In addition to these scholars, Norris and Inglehart (2004) find that in the macro-level, 
development directly affects the relationship between an individual and religious leaders’ 
authority. To test the effects of development, I follow Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) analysis and 
posit that in the macro environment: 
H3: The more developed the country that an individual lives in, the less often an individual 
is likely to contact a religious leader. 
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If Norris and Inglehart (2004) are correct, I expect to see that development and religious 
authority have a negative relationship.  
Operationalization20 
With my hypotheses being in the micro and macro levels of analysis, I do a multi-level 
analysis. I rely on the Afrobarometer 2008 Round 4 survey data for Burkina Faso, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. I am limited to these countries because they are the 
only dictatorships included in Round 4 and Round 4 is the only round that has a variable that can 
proxy for a dependent variable for trust in religious authority – frequency of contacting a 
religious leader. This dependent variable is ordinal. As such, the most appropriate method is an 
ordered logistical regression for both the micro and macro levels (Long 1997).   
Dependent Variable for all Hypotheses - Contact Religious Leader: The literature on 
secularization theory indicates that the appropriate focal point to establish whether or not a 
religious leader has congregational control surrounds the level of trust granted the religious 
leader (Chaves 1994). To account for this trust, I use the question in the Afrobarometer question 
that asks individuals how often they contact a religious leader about an important issue. I reason 
that the more often an individual contacts a religious leader about an issue, the more likely an 
individual trusts the religious leader.21 
Micro-Level: Hypothesis 1 
In the micro-level, I do an ordered logistical regression on each country’s individual level 
variables (Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The 
independent variable of interest is food insecurity.  
                                                          
20 All Afrobarometer questions used in this chapter and Chapter 4 are in the appendices for Chapter 3.  
21 Unfortunately, there is no question that asks directly the level of trust for religious leaders in the Afrobarometer 
survey data. For this reason, I use contacting a religious leader. 
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Independent Variable – Food Security: This variable measures how often an individual went 
without food in the past year. This variable also encompasses income; the more money one has 
the less likely one goes without food. With income being highly correlated with education, this 
variable also encompasses a certain level of individual educational differences. For these 
reasons, I believe this variable is appropriate to measure individual level survival security. 
Control Variables: 
Active/Inactive: These dichotomous variables measure whether or not an individual is an active 
member or an inactive member of a religious organization. 
Catholic and Muslim: With both of these religions being the most prevalent across Sub-Saharan 
Africa, I include two dichotomous variables to control for the effects of each. 
Age: With previous scholars noting a connection between religious authority and economic 
growth and development during an individual’s formative years, I include an age variable to 
control for the generational cohort differences (Hirschle 2010).  
Gender: Certain religions have certain traditional roles and limitations based on gender. To 
control for these differences, I include a gender control variable. 
Macro-Level: Hypothesis 2 
To test hypothesis 2, I include all of aforementioned variables and add country dichotomous 
variables to account for differences in industrialization, demographic shifts and culture (Georgi 
1992, McLeod 1992, Norris and Inglehart 2004). I rely on the Round 4 Merged Afrobarometer 
date.22 
Macro-Level Hypothesis 3 
                                                          
22 These data are merged by the Afrobarometer, housed at the University of Michigan. The Afrobarometer ensure 
that the standard errors are appropriate for an analysis. 
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To test hypothesis 3, I follow Norris and Inglehart (2004) and use the UN’s HDI Index to proxy 
for development in 2008. I include all the same variables from Hypothesis 1 except food 
insecurity. I exclude food insecurity because the Pearson correlation estimate shows that food 
insecurity and HDI are significantly correlated. 
Results 
Table 3.1 Ordered Logit. DV: Contact Religious Leader In the Past Year About a Personal Issue. 
 Model 1: Micro-Level Model 2 Model 3 
 Burkina  
Personal 
Uganda 
Personal 
Mozambique 
Single Party 
Tanzania 
Single 
Party 
Zambia 
Single 
Party 
Zimbabwe 
Single 
Party 
Country HDI 
Food 
Insecurity 
.054 
(..045) 
.045 
(.035) 
.005 
(.056) 
-.143*** 
(.523) 
-.078 
(.055) 
.107** 
(.051) 
.019 
(.019) 
c 
Age .002 
(.004) 
.008*** 
(.003) 
.011** 
(.005) 
.013*** 
(.004) 
.013*** 
(.004) 
.003 
(.004) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
.007*** 
(.002) 
Active -2.173*** 
(.236) 
-1.353*** 
(.097) 
-1.683*** 
(.203) 
-1.355*** 
(.172) 
-1.743*** 
(.235) 
-2.476*** 
(.217) 
-1.590*** 
(.065) 
-1.522*** 
(.063) 
Inactive -1.251*** 
(.193) 
-.379*** 
(.115) 
-1.154*** 
(.217) 
-.372 
(.304) 
-1.038*** 
(.255) 
-1.719*** 
(.234) 
-.812*** 
(.072) 
-.842*** 
(.071) 
Catholic -.141 
(.184) 
.079 
(.083) 
.361*** 
(.149) 
.195 
(.145) 
.275** 
(.137) 
.206 
(.167) 
.130*** 
(.053) 
.154*** 
(.051) 
Muslim .219 
(.159) 
.022 
(.142) 
-.244 
(.157) 
-.098 
(.147) 
a a -.008 
(.071) 
.165*** 
(.063) 
Gender -.558*** 
(.130) 
-.087 
(.079) 
-.122 
(.126) 
-.081 
(.122) 
-.252** 
(.102) 
.054 
(.123) 
-.146*** 
(.045) 
-.142*** 
(.045) 
Burkina 
Faso 
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ _________ .239*** 
(.097) 
________ 
Uganda ________ _________ _________ _________ _________ _________ -.188*** 
(.076) 
________ 
Mozambique ________ _________ _________ _________ _________ _________ .226*** 
(.090) 
________ 
Tanzania ________ _________ _________ _________ _________ _________ .610*** 
(.090) 
________ 
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Zambia ________ _________ _________ _________ _________ _________ -.008 
(.084) 
________ 
Zimbabwe  
 
________ _________ _________ _________ _________ b ________ 
HDI ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ 1.734*** 
(.445) 
N 
Cox Snell 
Nagelkerke 
1092 
.105 
.120 
2276 
.102 
.111 
1044 
.127 
.143 
1134 
.083 
.039 
1018 
.089 
.036 
1082 
.169 
.186 
7651 
.110 
.121 
7665 
.096 
.105 
***=99%, **=95%, *=90%, a-excluded due to lack of observations, b-excluded as redundant, c-excluded due to significant  
correlation with HDI (Pearson Test). 
For all the models, the two log likelihood shows that including the variables improves the 
models, the goodness of fit indicates that the models fit well with the data and the test for parallel 
lines shows that none of the models violate ordered logistical regression’s assumption of 
proportional odds; ordered logistical regression is more appropriate than multinomial logistical 
regression with the ordinal dependent variable of interest (Long 1997).  
Micro-Level-Model 1-Hypothesis 1 
No Support for Secularization Theory 
The results for model 1 show that the only countries that have a significant relationship 
between individual level survival food insecurity and contacting religious leaders are Tanzania 
and Zimbabwe with only Zimbabwe going in the expected direction. When looking at the 
situation in Zimbabwe, there is little support for hypothesis 1 and secularization theory. The 
dictator, Robert Mugabe, since independence, has confiscated farms from White people and 
handed these farms off to friends who have little to no farming knowledge (Meredith 2005). This 
confiscation has caused food output to plummet. In addition to growing food insecurity, he has 
also meddled in the economy causing extremely high inflation rates – some years as much as 
1000 percent (Meredith 2005). His meddling has led to food supply issues and the inflation rate 
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has complicated matter with citizens lacking funds to access the food that is available (Meredith 
2005). Given these issues, I think Zimbabwe does not support secularization theory and 
hypothesis 1; the significance is not due to development or lack thereof changing an individual’s 
level of food security inasmuch as it is due to country specific factors. Although I dismiss 
secularization theory’s development explanation of this finding, I do believe that religious 
leaders do have control over the congregations; it is just not due to development. I suspect, given 
the food situation in this country that individuals are indeed relying on religious leaders for food 
security. If an individual does not follow the religious leader’s expectation, the individual 
potentially places himself in a precarious survival position. I believe this explanation better 
accounts for Zimbabwe’s results. 
Tanzania’s results completely refute hypothesis 1 and secularization theory; as food security 
increases, individuals contact religious leaders more frequently. For these reasons, I believe there 
is little overall support for hypothesis 1 and secularization theory in this model.  
Potential Explanation for Age and Gender Control Variables 
Age shows positive significance with respect to the frequency of contacting a religious leader 
in Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. These results support Hirschle’s (2010) findings 
that age matters for religious authority due to an individual’s attachment made in formative 
years. I suspect that older generations who lived through independence movements have closer 
ties to religious leaders. In Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia, Great Britain granted independence 
with little preparation given to these countries. Post-Independence was turbulent and these 
countries were not able to provide for all of its citizens. Older generations plausibly had to rely 
heavily on religious leaders’ generosity for survival, thus explaining the positive and significant 
result for age in these countries (Meredith 2005).  
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Mozambique, on the other hand, was a Portuguese colony and independence was not granted 
but rather a war for independence ensued to rid the country of the Portuguese. This war ravaged 
the country with human rights atrocities on both sides (Meredith 2005). The older generations 
who lived through this war had to likely turn to charity to survive it. Older generations 
potentially have a strong attachment to religious leaders, who helped them survive during the 
struggle. This reasoning is in line with Hirschle’s (2010) addition of generational cohorts. 
Nonetheless, these results do not support hypothesis 1. 
The gender variables in Burkina Faso and Zambia show significant results in that females are 
more likely to contact religious leaders more often than male counterparts. I suspect that these 
results are due to country specific reasons regarding gender roles. 
Affiliation Control Variable - Conundrum Explained23 
Model 1 results run against expectations for affiliation; as an individual becomes more active 
in a religion, the individual contacts the religious leader less frequently, indicating that non-
members contact religious leaders more frequently than active or inactive members. I suspect 
that the reason my affiliation results contradict secularization theory is not so much that 
the theory is wrong but more so that these countries are at the precursory period to the theory.  
Martin (1978) and secularization theory scholars state that the theory’s effect only starts with 
sufficient development that has led to industrialization. Development is stagnant if not 
nonexistent in these countries (Table 3.0 at the beginning of this chapter). With development 
insufficient to trigger industrialization, a weakening of religious leaders’ control has not 
occurred. Rather, the precursory period in the literature is when religious leaders have maximum 
                                                          
23 The Catholic control variable shows positive significance in Mozambique and Zambia. These results are difficult 
to interpret because the positive coefficients are not large enough to change the affiliation trend discussed in this 
section. Catholic active and inactive members still contact a religious leader less frequently than unaffiliated 
individuals. 
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control over the populace because they are supplying security services. I believe that these 
results are showing that membership has its privileges; active and inactive members may be 
already reaping benefits of some form of association with religious leaders - food. These non-
members might know that these religious leaders have such resources and contact them more 
often to beg for help. I suspect that this finding indicates that religious leaders plausibly have a 
level of control over the populace.  
Macro-Level-Model 2-Hypothesis 2 
Some Support for Hypothesis 2 but No Support for Secularization Theory 
The results in model 2 show some support for country level factors affecting the frequency of 
an individual contacting a religious leader. The results indicate that Burkina Faso, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Uganda have significance. I believe that Mozambique shows significance for the 
reasons mentioned earlier – the independence war (Meredith 2005). Tanzania, Uganda and 
Burkina Faso show results indicating that there is something unique to each that drives their 
citizens’ frequency in contact religious leaders. Although the results show some support for 
hypothesis 2, they show no support for secularization theory – food security is insignificant. 
Control Variables of Gender and Age 
The control variables for gender and age both show significance and directionality in 
concurrence with Model 1. As discussed previously, I believe that these control variables are 
picking up on gender roles placed by religion and Hirschle’s (2010) generational cohort 
argument. 
 Affiliation Control Variable – Conundrum Continues24  
                                                          
24 As was the case in Model 1, the Catholic control variable shows positive significance; yet, the positive coefficient 
is not large enough to change the affiliation trend. Catholic active and inactive members still contact a religious 
leader less frequently than unaffiliated individuals. 
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The affiliation variables follow the same pattern exhibited in Model 1. I believe that these 
results in Model 2 are lending support to my belief that these countries are in a precursory period 
to secularization theory and that religious leaders do have control (Martin 1978).     
Macro-Level-Model 3-Hypothesis 3 
No Support for Hypothesis 3 or Secularization Theory 
The results show a positive and significant relationship between development and how often 
an individual contacts a religious leader. These results run contrary to both hypothesis 3 and 
secularization theory which expects that a negative relationship between development and 
individuals contacting religious. Secularization theory has no support from this model. 
Control Variables of Gender and Age 
The control variables for gender and age follow the same trend as in Model 1 and 2; as age 
increases, individuals contact religious leaders more often and females contact religious leaders 
more often. I believe that this finding lends support for Hirschle’s (2010) generational cohort 
findings as discussed previously. I also believe that the gender results are due to gender roles 
within the societies. 
Affiliation Control Variable – Conundrum Still Present25 
As was the case in Model 1 and 2, the affiliation results are significant and follow a negative 
directionality. I surmise that this result is showing that the development, in terms of HDI, is 
insufficient to trigger industrialization and, therefore, insufficient to weaken religious leaders’ 
control and influence over the populace. With this finding spanning across all models, I believe 
that these countries are in a pre-industrialization state lending credence to my belief that religious 
                                                          
25 The Catholic and Muslim control variables show positive significance. Yet, the positive coefficients are not large 
enough to change the affiliation trend. Catholic and Muslim active and inactive members still contact a religious 
leader less frequently than unaffiliated individuals. 
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leaders have strong levels of control over congregations and possibly unaffiliated individuals 
consistent with pre-secularization scholarly thought (Martin 1978). 
Implications 
All three models show little to no concrete evidence to support either the hypotheses or 
secularization theory. The evidence does, however, suggest that religious leaders do have a 
certain and appreciable level of control over the populace as a whole. I come to this reasoning by 
looking at development in all of these countries and the consistent results across all models with 
respect to affiliation and contacting a religious leader. Table 3.0 at the beginning of this chapter 
indicated that in terms of development, all of these countries fall below what the UN considers 
the least developed category.26  
With secularization theory’s effects needing industrialization to diminish religious leaders’ 
control, I believe a reasonable expectation exists that religious leaders do have control and are 
providing for the citizenry’s survival security; the states’ development levels are too low for 
widespread industrialization or for the state to have resources to guarantee survival security for 
its citizens. I believe that the consistent findings across all of the models showing that those who 
contact religious leaders most often are those that are unaffiliated further supports my belief that 
religious leaders have control in the society and are providing for the society’s survival security. 
My reasoning is that membership has its benefits and if members are following religious leaders, 
they are attaining some level of benefits to guarantee survival. The unaffiliated populace sees 
that these members are being provided for and contacts religious leaders more often to beg for 
help. Therefore, the religious leaders have not only a certain level of control over active and 
inactive members but also a level of control over unaffiliated members.   
                                                          
26 HDI score for the following countries are: Mozambique=.306, Burkina Faso=.322, Zimbabwe=.345, 
Tanzania=.414, Zambia=.420, Uganda=.437, least developed is considered as having a score of .457 or less. 
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Alternative Explanation 
A counterargument to these implications stems from a competing theory - religious market 
theory. According to religious market theory, 
religions act as firms within the religious market 
place. Religious leaders, the firm’s employees, vie 
for consumers. These leaders compete for consumers 
- congregational members. The competition forces 
religious leaders to offer incentives to individuals, 
coaxing the individuals to join the congregations as 
members via such incentives (Stark 1997, Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). From this theory, an expectation 
exists that in religiously pluralistic societies, the 
pluralism forces competition. 
As competition increases, religious leaders increase enticements to the populace. These 
enticements continue to maintain membership and attract new members. Therefore, if religious 
market theory were correct, I would expect to see that as religious pluralism increases, religious 
authority becomes more likely; enticements are benefits that could plausibly supply individuals 
with survival security. 
To test religious market theory, I redo model 3 and add in religious fractionalization from the 
Quality of Governance’s data. As this measurement increases, religious society becomes more 
fractionalized. Therefore, I expect to see that as fractionalization increases, religious authority 
becomes more likely.  
Table 3.2 Religious Fractionalization Effects 
 Model 3 Redone Ordered Logit 
HDI 3.062*** 
(.487) 
___________ 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
-3.105*** 
(.438) 
-2.049*** 
(.398) 
Age .008*** 
(.002) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
Active -1.566*** 
(.236) 
-1.559*** 
(.064) 
Inactive -.874*** 
(.071) 
-.814*** 
(.070) 
Catholic .174*** 
(.051) 
.149*** 
(.051) 
Muslim .103 
(.064) 
.187*** 
(.063) 
Gender -.136*** 
(.045) 
-.138*** 
(.045) 
N 
Cox Snell 
Nagelkerke 
7665 
.102 
.112 
7665 
.097 
.107 
***=99%, **=95%, *=90% 
48 
 
I first run a model that incorporates HDI and religious fractionalization. In this model, 
religious fractionalization is statistically significant. I then look at the coefficients to see the 
effects that religious fractionalization’s coefficient has on the likelihood to contact a religious 
leader. As a society becomes more fractionalized, thus more religiously plural, the likelihood of 
contacting a religious leader decreases; the opposite of the expected effect if religious market 
theory were correct. To ensure that HDI did not affect the results, I did the model again and 
excluded HDI. The results showed the same pattern for religious fractionalization. 
With the model including religious fractionalization unable to show a significant relationship 
between an increase in religious pluralism and religious leaders’ contact, I do not believe that 
this theory is a sound explanation for religious authority within my sample. 
Conclusion 
By religious market theory failing to show a real explanation for religious authority and the 
findings in this chapter showing minor to no support for secularization theory, I surmise that 
religious leaders have deference and a level of control over the general populace. I come to this 
conclusion by looking at the low levels of development in these countries and reasoning that the 
situation in each is in a precursory stage to secularization theory; levels of development are too 
low to begin industrialization and without such industrialization, religious leaders do not lose 
control. The findings regarding affiliation across all three models support my deductive 
reasoning. Religious leaders do have control over both members, be it active or inactive, and 
non-members in their respective societies  
This chapter offers several areas for future research. The first possible avenue for future 
research is to look at democracies and see if democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa have similar 
results. Such a similarity could indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa stands in a unique situation 
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regarding secularization theory and religious leaders’ authority. In addition to looking at 
democracies, further research could show differences in denominational control and how it 
changes from state to state. All of these possibilities would aid to clarify issues in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Holy Support: Catholic and Islamic Leader and Member Dictatorship Support 
In Chapter 3, I presented evidence that in Burkina Faso, Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe, religious leaders may influence the populace that affiliates with a 
religion. I reasoned that with this populace going to religious leaders with problems, religious 
leaders’ opinions matter and, therefore, religious leaders have a certain level of control over the 
populace. By having such control, these leaders are valuable assets to a dictatorship if they 
support the dictatorship; they exert their opinion on others to support the dictatorship. 
A dictatorship, when deciding whether or not to gain support from religious leaders, weighs 
the costs of such support – opportunity cost for including the religious leaders – and the benefits 
attained – the size of the religious leaders’ following that will support the dictatorship. Not all 
dictatorships are the same, and this cost-benefit analysis depends on a plethora of country level 
factors such as development and religious plurality27. 
In addition to these country level factors, the type of dictatorship further constrains the 
dictatorship’s cost-benefit analysis. Geddes (1999; 2003) draws a distinction between the cost-
benefit analysis for a single party and a personal dictatorship. A personal dictatorship is better off 
hoarding resources and keeping the amount of elites to a minimum. The dictatorship looks for 
the greatest benefits with a cost structure that is easy to maintain; the wealthy and military meet 
these requirements (Geddes 1999; 2003).  
A single party dictatorship, on the other hand, has a cost-benefit analysis that does not focus 
on hoarding the resources to the same extent as a personal dictatorship. This type of dictatorship 
functions through a party structure and resources are allocated to party members who are the 
                                                          
27 I assume that dictatorships act as rational actors. 
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elites. However, a single party dictatorship allows for an easy means to coopt opposition by 
either extending party membership or paying off the opposition. Paying off the opposition 
silences the opposition; the opposition is better off remaining silent because some payment is 
better than no payment (Geddes 1999; 2003). 
Catholic and Islamic religious leaders, due to the religious hierarchy of each, are the likely 
choices for elites when the benefits of these leaders’ support outweigh the costs of excluding 
other groups as elites. This hierarchy lowers the potential costs by allowing a dictatorship to pay 
off the head leaders of the religious hierarchy who can demand compliance from subordinates; 
non-hierarchical religions require a payment to each religious leader and are cost prohibitive. 
Both a single party and a personal dictatorship can incorporate Catholic and Islamic religious 
leaders as elites when the cost-benefit analysis allows for such. These circumstances of inclusion 
as elites, in my sample of countries, are likely rare; Burkina Faso, Uganda, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are not unequivocally Catholic or Muslim.  
With both dictatorship types rationally including Catholic and Islamic religious leaders as 
elites but very few instances existing in my sample, the appropriate focal point is not how and 
when these dictatorships choose religious leaders as elites but rather how they treat religious 
leaders in the opposition. In this chapter, I agree with Geddes (2003) that these two types of 
dictatorship treat the opposition differently, and I argue that if Catholic and Islamic religious 
leaders are in the opposition, their support for the dictator should differ depending on the type of 
dictatorship. A connection should exist between Catholic and Islamic religious leaders being 
more likely to support the dictator in a single party dictatorship than in a personal dictatorship. 
Clarifying this relationship explains the mechanics of how these types of dictatorships’ cost-
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benefit analysis functions, as well as how Catholic and Islamic religious leaders matter to a 
dictatorship.  
I proceed in this chapter by offering a literature review on the theory of social capital and 
patronage. I then explain my hypotheses and expectations. I follow the hypotheses section with 
an operationalization section where I explain my variables. After explaining my variables, I 
report my results and offer implications from my results. I subsequently consider alternative 
explanations to my results. I then conclude by restating my theory and results and offer avenues 
for future research.       
Literature Review 
Social capital theory links government and institutional effectiveness to trust among a state’s 
social organizations (Putnam 1993). In states that have trust among social organizations, such 
trust facilitates all social organizations to coordinate efforts to make institutions and government 
effective; trust among social organizations leads to a civic culture that promotes institutional 
performance (Putnam 1993; Inglebert 2000). From this theory, high levels of trust among groups 
in a state lead to strong institutions and state development by all groups supporting policy for the 
betterment of society as a whole (Putnam 1993).  
The implication of this theory with respect to Sub-Saharan African institutions is that weak 
institutions derive from lack of ethnic homogeneity (Inglebert 2000). This lack of homogeneity 
leads to ethnic leaders’ rivalry with the state’s resources being the point of contention rather than 
cooperation; each leader fights to secure resources for his group to the detriment of other groups 
(Inglebert 2000). Weak institutions provide the means for each ethnic group to vie for state 
resources in lieu of cooperation through trust to create mutual long term development and 
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institutions; resource accumulation in the short term is more important than long term goals of 
effective institutions due to the mistrust among the groups (Inglebert 2000). 
However, scholars note that ethnic heterogeneity in Sub-Saharan Africa does not adequately 
explain weak institutions due to ethnicity being fluid (Bayart 1993; Inglebert 2000; Posner 
2006). Ethnicity is not a primordial relationship between the individual and a group but rather is 
fluid depending on what cleavage offers the best benefits (Inglebert 2000; Posner 2006). 
Therefore, social capital does not explain weak institutions because the causal mechanism of 
ethnic heterogeneity is faulty (Widner and Mundt 1998). 
Rather than a social capital explanation, weak institutions are a product of a dictatorship 
wishing to maximize survival. Weak institutions afford a dictatorship more ease to use state 
resources to extend survival; a strong and pesky legislature controlling the budget or a judiciary 
invalidating the dictator’s decisions gets in the way of maintaining power by potentially negating 
the dictator’s distribution of patronage (Nafziger 1988). Therefore, the continuance of such weak 
institutions becomes a necessary precursor to increase dictatorship survival. Weak institutions 
allow a dictatorship to achieve a level of stability, and thus higher survival, through clientelism.      
Clientelism is an agency relationship where a principal trades patronage with agents who, in 
turn, provide the principal a benefit (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2008). This relationship takes the 
form of a bilateral agreement, a patronage contract, between the two. The contract provides for 
how the principal, the dictatorship, distributes state resources to the agents, the elites, and the 
agents’ obligations to the principal for such resources. This resource distribution occurs by either 
the agents directly accessing the states’ resources through political appointment or by receiving 
direct state resource payments from the dictatorship (Van de Walle 2007; Ariola 2009). One side 
failing to live up to the agreement in the patronage contract creates a breach of contract. Such a 
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breach potentially creates a conflict. Scholars find that this breach directly affects a dictatorship’s 
likelihood of survival (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003). When a 
breach occurs between the dictatorship and the elites, both sides try to incentivize the general 
populace to fight for a side (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This breach can lead to the ultimate 
societal breakdown, civil war. In addition to a conflict between the dictatorship and its elites, 
intra-elites’ conflict can similarly destabilize the patronage contracts for all and include the 
general populace in the conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Therefore, a breach in the patronage 
contract proves salient in explaining the destabilization of a dictatorship and a change in a 
dictatorship’s survival likelihood. 
Combining the literature on the theory of social capital and thought regarding clientelism, a 
dictatorship, therefore, prefers weak institutions because weak institutions allow for patronage 
contracts whereby a dictatorship has stronger control over resources to fulfill its end of the 
contract; weak institutions avoid justifications for patronage pay outs by a dictatorship. Having 
control over the patronage, payments remain steady provided no exogenous shocks occur. Steady 
payments provide stability. In addition to a dictatorship’s stability and survival, the continued 
stability provides the dictatorship with a sense of international legitimacy (Migdal 1988; Bratton 
and Van de Walle 1997). Therefore, legitimacy becomes a product of this clientelistic 
relationship and patronage contracts and is more likely achievable with weak institutions (Hyden 
2006; Van de Walle 2007).  
Some scholars turn to the effects that natural resources provide. Natural resources provide a 
consistent source of revenue from which a dictatorship can guarantee payments to elites (Bannon 
and Collier 2003; Dunning 2008). Being able to make consistent patronage contract payments 
shows a commitment on the part of the dictatorship to its elites. The elites, in turn, aid survival 
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by keeping the populace at bay. From this standpoint, these scholars find that a dictatorship’s 
survival can equate to the presence of natural resources (Ross 2001). Yet, Sub-Saharan African 
examples challenge this stance. Botswana, a resource rich country, has used such resources to 
democratize and maintain a democratic government. The rulers and elites in Botswana, rather 
than hoarding the benefits from these resources, have extended the benefits throughout the state 
to the citizenry, using said resources to strengthen and create institutions. What matters more is 
how the revenue from the resources is treated; an ipso facto expectation that natural resources 
equate to a dictatorship’s survival does not necessarily hold true. 
Other scholars have found the opposite effect, with the presence of natural resources 
correlating with a consistent lack of stability for any type of government. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) reason that a resource curse exists that makes states with natural resources less stable. 
This lack of stability occurs due to either the greed of the elites or the grievances of the populace 
or a combination of both. Greedy elites seize natural resources and use revenue to try to seize 
power. They can use revenues from such resources to address grievances among the populace, 
gaining support of the populace. The populace itself can also seize the resources and use the 
proceeds to overthrow the government, or some combination of all scenarios may occur. The end 
result of all scenarios is that natural resources have a negative survival effect due to greed or 
grievance.  
Due to the inconsistencies in the natural resource explanation, other scholars turn to a 
dictatorship’s strategic decisions when choosing elites to explain stability. Bayart (1993) argues 
that dictators incorporate ethnic representatives as elites to unite the state. These different ethnic 
elites cooperate to divvy up state resources and pass enough along to the citizens to keep the 
dictatorship stable. With all ethnic groups being represented in the patronage structure, stability 
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ensues. Yet, this argument assumes that the dictator has the capabilities to include all ethnic 
groups and that the dictator treats all elites equally enough to avoid an intra-elites conflict. If this 
argument were plausible, no breakdown on ethnic terms should occur, yet, Horowitz (1985) 
notes that is has. Furthermore, some dictatorships exclude certain ethnic groups; if this is not 
wise and places a dictatorship in peril of revolt, such exclusion should never occur due to its 
irrationality (Ronniger 2004). 
According to Roessler (2011), the type of dictatorship accounts for who the elites are. In a 
single party dictatorship, the elites are party members and the structure is open (Geddes 1999; 
2003; Ezrow and Frantz 2011). Therefore, the arguments looking merely at incorporating ethnic 
leaders fail to acknowledge such openness and how not only ethnic leaders but also religious 
leaders can become elites through party membership. This structure’s inclusiveness links to an 
expectation that patronage spreads across party members; membership has some benefits or 
trickle down benefits due to party association. Ronniger (2004) explains that patronage does not 
have to be equal but rather a proportional representation of the elites’ or oppositions’ benefit to 
the dictatorships’ costs. Some elites can have higher levels of patronage than others depending 
on what these elites offer as benefits to the survival of the dictatorship. The overall logical 
expectation for this type of dictatorship is that the inclusive access to elites’ status spreads 
patronage, although in some cases unequally, among party members. Most can become party 
members. With most being party members and having some level of patronage from the 
dictatorship, most support the dictatorship. Thus, this type of dictatorship should have higher 
survival likelihood than a personal dictatorship.   
A personal dictatorship does not have this inclusive structure and is exclusive (Geddes 1999; 
2003; Enzrow and Frantz 2011). Furthermore, the elites are a minimum winning coalition to 
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ensure dictator survival; too many elites create a potential funding issue for the patronage 
contracts given limited resources (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Roessler 2011). The 
incorporation of elites becomes a strategic and tactical decision based on the ability of the 
dictator to meet patronage contract obligations and the benefits offered by potential elites (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 2003; Roessler 2011). With the exclusivity of elites’ status and requiring a 
minimum winning coalition, a personal dictatorship incorporates elites that best supply benefits 
based on how much the dictatorship can afford. Therefore, patronage should be more 
concentrated and less spread out than in single party dictatorships. With the exclusivity of the 
elites’ status, the populace should have less trickle down patronage than in a single party 
dictatorship where elites’ status is more open. This difference in patronage should translate to a 
difference in support: a single party dictatorship’s spreading the wealth should equate to a higher 
likelihood of support than in a personal dictatorship. 
Hypotheses 
With the noted differences by scholars 
between single party and personal dictatorships, I 
argue that these dictatorships can strategically 
include Catholic and Islamic religious leaders as 
elites in instances where these leaders’ benefit of 
support, in terms of influence over followers, 
outweigh the costs of patronage to such leaders.  
For the benefits to outweigh the costs, these religious leaders need to exist in a state where 
enough of the populace follows the faith so that this mass, if mobilized, may threaten the 
dictatorship’s survival. Without threat capacity, each dictatorship’s patronage is better spent on 
Table 4.0 Religious Breakdown Per Country  
Country Dictatorship 
Type 
Percent 
Catholic 
Percent 
Muslim 
    
Burkina Faso Personal 9% 43% 
 
Cameroon Personal 35% 22% 
Cote D’Ivoire Personal 18.5% 24% 
Togo Personal 29.3% 17% 
Uganda Personal 49.6% 6.6% 
Mozambique Single Party 31.4% 13% 
 
Tanzania Single Party 28.2% 32.5% 
Zambia Single Party 26.2% .3% 
Zimbabwe Single Party 14.4% .9% 
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other elites, such as the military who can subjugate these religious leaders and their followers. 
Table 4.0 shows the religious breakdown for Catholicism and Islam in my sample. No state has a 
majority of the populace adhering to either religion. For this reason, I assume that the 
overwhelming majority of the Catholic and Islamic religious leaders are in the opposition in both 
dictatorships. Thus, the focal point on the potential effects of such religious leaders shifts to the 
noted differences by Geddes (2003) in how a personal and a single party dictatorship deals with 
the opposition; a single party coopts opposition with patronage whereas a personal dictatorship 
excludes opposition. 
Due to such a difference, I contend that: 
H1: Catholic and Islamic religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are more likely to 
support the dictatorship than counterparts in a personal dictatorship. 
 
If a single party dictatorship coopts Catholic and Islamic religious leaders by offering some form 
of patronage, I expect to see these leaders react to such cooptation by significantly supporting the 
dictatorship. Furthermore, I expect the opposite to hold true when the dictatorship is personal; 
Catholic and Islamic religious leaders in a personal dictatorship should receive no patronage and 
therefore show no significance in support. 
With a difference in support between religious leaders and dictatorship type, Catholic and 
Islamic religious leaders, to maintain patronage, need to provide a benefit to the single party 
dictatorship. These leaders preach support to congregations. To ascertain such a connection, I 
hypothesize that: 
H2: Catholic and Islamic religious members in a single party dictatorship are more likely 
to support the dictatorship than counterparts in a personal dictatorship. 
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If religious leaders in a single party dictatorship gain patronage and want to continue such 
patronage, their preaching of support should equate to members being more likely to support it; 
they are being paid off to produce support. Conversely, religious leaders in a personal 
dictatorship are excluded, they do not preach support and subsequently, religious membership 
has no significance on support.  
To test my hypotheses, I use the merged Afrobarometer 2008-2012 individual level data for 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Mozambique, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. With my dependent variable being dichotomous, I run a binary logistical regression 
(Long 1997).  
Operationalization28 
Dependent Variable: To ascertain support, I recode a variable to represent if an individual 
unequivocally supports the dictator’s party. All the states in the sample have a political party 
linked to the dictator. Geddes (2003) explains that part of each dictatorship’s survival strategy is 
the decision of whether or not to incorporate a political party. Although all the states in the 
sample have political parties, the difference between a single party and a personal dictatorship 
centers on the strength of the party to make policy according to Geddes (2003). Geddes (2003) 
further explains that a personal dictatorship can have parties but the dictator has ultimate 
authority on policy whereas the party in a single party dictatorship has some level of control over 
policy. With all the states having parties, using this dependent variable facilitates a comparison 
between both dictatorship types.  
Independent Variables:  
                                                          
28 In the appendices  for Chapter 4, Table 4.A gives the state information for the sample: type of dictatorship, 
dictatorship’s leader and political party associated with the dictatorship. 
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Catholic and Islamic Religious Leaders (Hypothesis 1): I filter the respondents in the merged 
data to create four dichotomous variables for Catholic and Islamic Leaders in Single Party and 
Personal dictatorships. These individuals are those who self-reported as being religious leaders in 
the merged Afrobarometer. 
Catholic and Islamic Members (Hypothesis 2):  I filter the respondents in the merged data to 
create four dichotomous variables for Catholic and Islamic members in Single Party and 
Personal dictatorships. These individuals are those who self-reported as being active members in 
a religious organization in the merged Afrobarometer. 
Control Variables: 
Cash Security: Cash security is a dichotomous variable for individuals that never go without 
cash. With this variable, I am controlling for the elites within the society, the wealthy and 
military. I assume that since both of these groups are essential to a dictatorship, as noted by 
scholars, neither will likely ever go without money.  
Income: Income is different from cash security in that it measures the level of employment an 
individual has as either no, part time or full time employment. I use this variable to proxy for 
state level economic conditions. This variable does not significantly correlate with cash security.   
Demographics (Age, Gender, Education and Urban): With African populaces’ age distribution 
being skewed to the rest of the world, I include a control for Age. With some religions placing 
females in a more subservient role, I include a control variable for Gender. Education Level 
frequently links to a negative relationship to the likelihood of religious authority’s deference, for  
this reason, I control for education level. I include a dichotomous variable, Urban, if the 
individual lives in an urban or rural area to account for differing levels of development. Herbst 
(2000) notes that migration to cities in a dictatorship has pushed urban infrastructure to its limits.  
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Dictatorship development has been arguably concentrated in urban areas to the detriment of the 
rural society; this plausibly could lead to a difference in patronage access. 
Results 
The results for hypothesis 1 indicate that in a single party dictatorship, Catholic and Islamic 
religious leaders are significantly more 
likely to support the dictatorship than 
Catholic and Muslim religious leaders in 
a personal dictatorship. Catholic and 
Islamic leaders in a single party 
dictatorship are 95 and 96 percent more 
likely to support the dictatorship, 
respectively.30 This finding lends 
support to hypothesis 1 and indicates 
that plausibly Catholic and Islamic 
religious leaders receive some sort of 
patronage in exchange for support in a single party dictatorship but not in a personal dictatorship, 
all things being equal. Given all the control variables, these results support hypothesis 1.31 
Hypothesis 2 turns to a potential connection between these religious leaders and their 
congregations. If these religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are receiving patronage, 
                                                          
29 Because I am using a binary logistical regression, I need to exclude a group to be used as a reference to make a 
comparison possible. In Model 1, Catholic and Muslim Leaders in a personal dictatorship are the reference group. In 
Model 2, Catholic and Muslim Leaders in a single party dictatorship are the reference group. By running both of 
these models, I am also checking for the robustness of my findings.  
30 Table 4.B in the Appendix has the predicted probabilities. 
31 In Table 4.1, Model 1 reports significance for the control variables of Cash Security, Gender and Education and 
Model 2 reports significance for the control variable of Education. With the results being a comparison to a 
reference group, these control variables have little predictive capabilities other than to add onto the independent 
variables of interest’s predictive probabilities.  
Table 4.1: Catholic and Muslim Leader Support Likelihood29 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 2.141*** 
(.554) 
.635* 
(.379) 
Catholic Leaders Single Party .723*** 
(.297) 
_____ 
Catholic Leaders Personal _____ .382 
(.314) 
Muslim Leaders Single Party 1.022** 
(.483) 
_____ 
Muslim Leaders Personal _____ .658 
(.423) 
Cash Security .677** 
(.330) 
1.435** 
(.646) 
Age -.003 
(.009) 
.000 
(.002) 
Gender .554** 
(.248) 
-.457 
(.297) 
Income -.114 
(.105) 
.135 
(.128) 
Urban -.307 
(.272) 
.255 
(.382) 
Education -.394*** 
(.089) 
-.049 
(.084) 
N 
Cox Snell 
Nagelkerke 
398 
.112 
.163 
251 
.057 
.079 
***=99%, **=95%, *=90%   
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such patronage is likely tied to the garnering of support from the congregation. In addition to 
such a connection in a single party dictatorship, these results should show no connection in a 
personal dictatorship if no patronage exchange exists as suggested by the results for hypothesis 
1. 
The results for hypothesis 2 affirm the possibility of such a connection. These results show 
that Catholic and Muslim members in a 
single party dictatorship are significantly 
more likely to support the dictatorship 
than members of other religions. In a 
personal dictatorship, however, 
Catholics and Muslims show no 
significance indicating that they do not 
act significantly different in terms of 
dictatorship support. These results 
follow my expectations for hypothesis 
2.33   
When comparing the Catholics and Muslims in each dictatorship type and their expected 
likelihood of support, Catholic and Muslim members have a substantially higher level of 
likelihood for dictatorship support. The findings indicate that potentially a connection exists 
                                                          
32 Table 4.C in the Appendix has the predicted probabilities. Because I am using a binary logistical regression, I 
need to exclude a group to be used as a reference to make a comparison possible. In Model 1, Catholic and Muslim 
Members in a personal dictatorship are the reference group. In Model 2, Catholic and Muslim Members in a single 
party dictatorship are the reference group. By running both of these models, I am also checking for the robustness of 
my findings. 
In Table 4.2, Model 1 reports significance for the control variables of Cash Security, Gender, Urban and Education 
and Model 2 reports significance for the control variables of Cash Security, Income, Urban and Education. With the 
results being a comparison to a reference group, these control variables have little predictive capabilities other than 
to add onto the independent variables of interest’s predictive probabilities. 
Table 4.2: Catholic and Muslim Member Support Likelihood32 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 1.704*** 
(.201) 
.994*** 
(.335) 
Catholic Members Single Party .276*** 
(.110) 
_____ 
Catholic Members Personal _____ .155 
(.172) 
Muslim Members Single Party .718** 
(.149) 
_____ 
Muslim Members Personal _____ .288 
(.250) 
Cash Security .641** 
(.155) 
.521** 
(.277) 
Age .003 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.006) 
Gender -.244*** 
(.097) 
-.176 
(.170) 
Income .048 
(.045) 
.130** 
(.073) 
Urban -.323*** 
(.107) 
-.329* 
(.205) 
Education -.264*** 
(.034) 
-.147*** 
(.049) 
N 
Cox Snell  
Nagelkerke  
2393 
.066 
.095 
709 
.035 
.048 
***=99%, **=95%, *=90%   
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between Catholic and Islamic religious leaders and their congregations in a single party 
dictatorship. In a personal dictatorship, neither leaders nor members are significant. With both in 
a single party dictatorship having significance and both in a personal dictatorship lacking 
significance, I reason that each dictatorship is treating Catholic and Islamic religious leaders 
differently, and differential treatment leads to different support for each dictatorship among 
congregations. 
Implications 
These findings imply that Catholic and Muslim leaders in a single party dictatorship are 
likely receiving some form of patronage to provide support for the dictatorship. To continue such 
payment, these leaders must garner support amongst their respective congregations. With the 
results indicating that the active religious members of each respective religion are significantly 
more likely to support the single party dictatorship, I believe that these religious leaders are 
indeed preaching support and that the congregations are reacting. The personal dictatorships 
show the opposite; no likelihood of leader support and, in turn, no likelihood of active members’ 
support for the dictatorship.    
Alternative Explanations 
Although feasible, scholars have alternative explanations to explain the same connection. 
One such explanation surrounds the use of natural resources. Plausibly, a single party 
dictatorship may have higher levels of natural resources than a personal dictatorship. These 
natural resources allow a dictatorship more flexibility with patronage spending by providing a 
consistent and constant revenue stream. However, in the Afrobarometer sample, the only states 
that have natural resources are Cameroon and Cote D’Ivoire, both personal dictatorships. If 
natural resources played a connection between a dictatorship and its purchasing power to include 
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religious leaders, I would expect Catholic and Islamic religious leaders in these two states to 
have a higher likelihood of support. To verify, I reran the binary logistical regressions with a 
dichotomous variable controlling for both states. No significance resulted from my attempts. Due 
to such, I conclude that natural resources are not playing a factor in my analysis. 
Apart from the alternative explanation of natural resources, an additional explanation exists 
to challenge my reasoning. With the difference between a single party and a personal 
dictatorship in the level of access to elites’ status, scholars argue that such a difference equates to 
differences in repression between both dictatorship types. A single party dictatorship can coopt 
critics and opposition by including such in party membership and thus patronage access. 
Personal dictatorships do not have such a means to address critics and opposition, and therefore 
are more likely to resort to repression. Such repression plausibly means that my findings of 
support between the two types of dictatorship could be biased; individuals in a personal 
dictatorship fear responding in the negative. If such a fear exists, as a result of either repression 
or a credible threat that it may occur, exists, I expect that Catholic and Islamic religious leaders 
and members should support the personal dictatorship sufficiently to show significance.  
I further think that little fear exists. I come to this conclusion by looking at whether or not 
religious members in a personal dictatorship are willing to partake in or have partaken in the 
signing of a petition, a boycott or a protest. If such fear existed, the respondents would not 
question such permanent and traceable acts of defiance against the personal dictator and merely 
answer that they fully support said dictator. Yet, 77, 59 and 73 percent of Religious Leaders, 
Active Members and Inactive Members respectively report having done or are willing to partake 
in the signing of a petition, a boycott or a protest. Such willingness to defy the dictator leads me 
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to believe that the results for higher likelihood of support in a single party dictatorship are not 
due to repression fears by the respondents in a personal dictatorship. 
Conclusion  
Having found little evidence that alternative arguments better explain my results than my 
argument, I conclude that this chapter shows support the hypothesis that patronage access 
differences between a single party and a personal dictatorship exist and are due to the structural 
differences of the accessibility to elites’ status. With a single party dictatorship being generally 
inclusive, the patronage access becomes spread to include Catholic and Islamic religious leaders, 
whereas a personal dictatorship’s exclusivity targets select elites and such elites provide, if 
needed, trickle down patronage to the citizenry. For this reason, religious leaders in a personal 
dictatorship have less likelihood of patronage access than those in a single party dictatorship. To 
maintain such access, these religious leaders garner support among congregations, explaining 
why members in a single party dictatorship are significantly more likely to support the 
dictatorship than those in a personal dictatorship.  
This chapter has several avenues for future research that can strengthen the argument. Much 
literature looks to see the size of and who makes up the minimum winning coalition of elites in a 
dictatorship. Clarifying this issue contributes by showing the distinctions between religious 
denominations and the reasoning behind choosing some religious leaders over others if such 
choices exist. Apart from the coalition building process, future research should also focus on the 
differences in patronage between political appointments and pay offs and how each affects 
religious leaders. This finding would help in establishing a more cohesive argument regarding 
patronage access. 
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Chapter 5: Holy Survival – Catholic and Islamic Effects on a Dictatorship’s Survival 
 
Chapter 4 explored the differences in Catholic and Islamic religious leaders’ support and 
subsequent congregational support depending on the dictatorship type. The chapter showed that 
due to internal mechanics, a single party dictatorship more frequently includes such leaders for 
the benefit of congregational support. This chapter concerns how such support translates into a 
difference in survival expectations between a single party and personal dictatorship. 
In terms of survival expectations, scholars find that the relationship between a dictatorship 
and its elites alters a dictatorship’s survival expectancy depending on whether the dictatorship 
maintains its patronage structure to its elites. The elites are quintessential for a dictatorship to 
maintain power by insulating the dictatorship from citizenry challenges. According to scholars, 
these elites are the wealthy and the military; both logically provide insulation from citizens by 
providing the necessary resources to the dictatorship to remain in power (Clapham 1996; 
Dadmehr 2003; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003; Lemarchand 2003; Van De Walle 2001; 2004; 
2007; Bolton 2007; Bates 2008; Ezrow and Frantz 2011). 
This explanation sufficiently creates a basis for a survival analysis but fails to account for 
other nuances that are at a dictatorship’s disposal such as elections (Ghandi and Prezworski 
2006; Magaloni 2006; 2008). Elections create a means for a dictatorship to establish some form 
of international legitimacy, albeit that many of these institutional structures are far from free and 
fair. I agree with all of these scholars and seek to add an additional nuance to a dictatorship’s 
survival analysis: support garnered from religious leaders for the dictatorship. 
I proceed by offering a literature review on dictatorship survival, followed by a hypotheses 
section where I outline the hypotheses and explain the testing. In the operationalization section, I 
explain my variables. I subsequently report the results and account for alternative explanations. I 
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conclude by restating my argument and the support from this chapter and end by offering 
possible areas for future research. 
Literature Review 
Geddes (1999, 2003) finds that a personal and a single party dictatorship differ in survival 
likelihood due to the differences in incentives for cooperation and the distribution of patronage. 
In a personal dictatorship, with the dictatorship being tied to the whim of an individual, the 
dictator needs to keep the elites to a minimum winning coalition to see an increase in dictator 
survivability. With a small coalition, the dictator can easily manage the elites by either a credible 
threat of exclusion and replacement or an instant transfer of funds (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 
2003). So long as the patronage to the elites continues, this dictatorship, barring exogenous 
shocks, can endure.34 In this dictatorship, little cooperation exists outside of the relationship 
between the dictator and the elites. Geddes finds these dictatorships exclude opposition from 
patronage; a personal dictatorship needs a minimum coalition of elites, and the patronage 
payments must continue to this group of elites to increase survival likelihood.  
A single party dictatorship differs from a personal dictatorship in that the dictatorship centers 
on a party structure. In this structure, elites are party members. Some governing council typically 
exists with the party leader being the dictator. To increase survival, the party can extend 
membership to an opposition or offer such an opposition some level of inferior patronage for its 
support. Receiving some patronage is better than none and effectively silences the opposition. 
                                                          
34 An additional nuance to Geddes’ argument is that an important destabilizing factor for both of these dictatorships 
comes from exogenous shocks. A personal dictatorship has a harder time weathering such shocks than a single party 
dictatorship. What is quintessential for a personal dictatorship is that the dictatorship be able to continue the system 
of patronage. If the dictatorship has a hard time meeting its patronage obligations, shocks destabilize the 
dictatorship. Not being able to pay the military or political officials creates destabilization that in turn leads to a 
decrease in dictator survival. A single party dictatorship, due to its institutional structure, can fare through 
exogenous shocks by coopting critics to join the party. I do not account for what happens during such shocks, my 
argument is currently focused on the nuance of how religious leaders and members change survival expectations in 
the absence of such shocks.  
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With such patronage flowing from the dictatorship, the opposition has incentives to cooperate 
with the dictatorship to continue patronage payments. By having the means to include 
opposition, a single party dictatorship survives longer than a personal dictatorship due to its 
ability to include the opposition. 
Levitsky and Way (2002) argue that the distinction between a personal and a single party 
dictatorship is not as clear cut as presented in Geddes’ (1999, 2003) argument. These scholars 
note the presence of elections in most dictatorships that are in some cases competitive. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, all current dictatorships have some form of elections. These scholars argue that 
the usage of elections may better explain survival than Geddes’ distinction between dictatorship 
types. These scholars advocate for a more concise distinction to be that of the competitiveness of 
such elections – deemed competitive authoritarian.  
Magaloni (2006; 2008) notes that in the current time period, most dictatorships exhibit a 
competitive authoritarian structure. Such a structure consists of routine elections, although not 
always free and fair, that directly affect the dictator’s survival. According to Magoloni (2006; 
2008), the institutionalization of elections provides a key means for the dictatorship to increase 
survivability. Apart from a way to redistribute spoils, elections serve to show members of the 
party that some order of succession and upward mobility is plausible, thus keeping members in 
rank and file with the prospects of upward mobility. A dictatorship may dole out such mobility 
or spoils in exchange for a service among party members to keep excluded citizens at bay. Thus, 
the power sharing structure acts as a means for maintaining the status quo and guarding against 
citizens.   
Apart from a means to guard against citizens, elections send a public message to these 
citizens. When a dictatorship’s party consistently wins at levels of 75 percent or higher, citizens 
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perceive a level of invincibility for the dictator’s party and in turn the dictator.35 Such 
invincibility sends a clear signal to citizens that the dictator has a strong hold on the office; 
strong enough to signal a credible threat to dissuade any revolt by the citizens or defection by the 
elites (Magaloni 2006). 
Svolik (2009) extends Magoloni’s findings by clarifying the relationship between the dictator 
and the ruling coalition. Svolik argues that the nature of the relationship creates a conflict of 
interests; the dictator consistently wants more power at the expense of the ruling coalition, and 
the ruling coalition wants to confine the dictator’s power. The ruling coalition may threaten the 
dictator with a coup d’état to try to dissuade the dictator’s power grab. The ability to confine the 
dictator centers on the ruling coalition’s credible threat. This threat credibility depends on 
whether or not the dictatorship is, in Svolik’s terms, “established” or “contested.” Contested 
dictatorships exhibit the power struggle between the dictator and the ruling coalition. In time, if 
the dictator achieves more power, he turns into an established dictator and his survival 
substantially increases. This change from contested to established occurs due to the ruling 
coalition’s level of credible threat changing. During the contested phase, the threat from the 
ruling coalition is credible so long as they act on it, succeed and keep the dictator in check. If the 
ruling coalition fails, the dictator gains more power. With the loss of credibility and a more 
powerful dictator, the ruling coalition becomes more hesitant to threaten, thus increasing the 
dictator’s survival rate and changing his status to an established dictator. 
Ghandi and Prezworski (2006) turn to a discussion of the dictator’s rationale for the creation 
of institutions and which institutions guarantee a higher likelihood of dictator survival so as to 
understand the nuances between a single party and personal dictatorship. They reason that 
dictators create legislatures as a response to a growing opposition (Ghandi and Prezworski 2006). 
                                                          
35 All dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa currently have some form of party apparatus. 
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The legislature allows the dictator the ability to coopt opposition members with some form of 
patronage by offering a legislative seat in exchange for support. Ghandi and Prezworski (2006) 
further reason that creating legislatures was an option of last resort; so long as the opposition 
remains weak, they expected to see no legislative institution.    
Geddes (2003) clarifies her typology with respect to elections and parties and addresses the 
nuances noted by previous scholars. She explains that a personal and single party dictatorship 
can have parties and elections, rather, the distinction remains between the two due to who 
essentially makes policy. She shows that in a personal dictatorship, the presence of a party or 
elections does not necessarily lead to a change in policy. Rather, in a personal dictatorship, the 
control over policy remains in the hands of the personal dictator, whereas policy in a single party 
dictatorship can be affected by the party and elections. Therefore, her typology and distinction 
between a single party and a personal dictatorship remains salient if a personal dictatorship has a 
party or elections. Moreover, her typology does not limit the analysis to a discussion of elections 
and parties but rather extends the discussion to a more in-depth look at the internal mechanics of 
both dictatorship types as to how each addresses the opposition. This decision has ramifications 
if the opposition poses a credible threat to destabilize the dictatorship. 
Religious authorities in the opposition can hinder a dictatorship (Casanova 1994). They have 
the ability to organize their congregations to react to a dictatorship in a negative manner (Moen 
and Gustafson 1992; Leege 1993; Jelen and Wilcox 2002). With such an ability, religious leaders 
in the opposition matter to a dictatorship if the congregational size poses a credible threat to the 
dictatorship (Jelen and Wilcox 2002). Little discussion in the dictatorship survival literature 
exists regarding the exact effects of religious authorities and congregations with respect to a 
dictatorship’s survival. 
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Hypotheses 
The survival literature finds that due to cooperation incentives in a single party dictatorship, 
this dictatorship has a higher survival rate than a personal dictatorship (Geddes 1999; 2003). To 
verify the findings, I posit that: 
H1: A single party dictatorship, all things being equal, has a higher survival likelihood than 
a personal dictatorship. 
 
If the literature is correct, I should see that a difference in survival exists. By testing the literature 
in such a fashion, I am able to set a base line survival expectation for each dictatorship. With 
such a general expectation, I can subsequently include religious factors to see the effects that 
such factors have on the survival likelihood between the two dictatorship types.36 
My overall argument contends that Catholic and Islamic religious leaders can be elites within 
both a single party and a personal dictatorship. In concurrence with the literature, the decision in 
both type of dictatorship as to who becomes part of the elites is a strategic decision by the 
dictatorship depending on the cost-benefit analysis for the dictatorship. Catholic and Islamic 
religious leaders who have a strong enough sway among the populace, I reason, logically become 
part of the elites due to the benefits of congregational support outweighing the costs of 
redirecting patronage to such religious leaders.  
With so few states having large swaths of Catholic or Islamic religious congregations, I 
reason that the vast majority of Catholic and Islamic religious leaders are not included as elites 
and remain in the opposition to the dictatorship. In the opposition, I contend that the effects that 
these religious leaders have on dictatorship survival depends on how each dictatorship treats the 
opposition. 
                                                          
36 The aggregate data for religion and religious variables are limited. Due to such limitations, I have to set a basis for 
survival and look at how the dictatorship coefficient changes in the Cox Hazard model. 
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Using Geddes’ (1999’ 2003) distinction between a personal and a single party dictatorship in 
how the dictatorship treats the opposition, these religious leaders, if the congregational size poses 
a credible threat, are likely offered some level of patronage, albeit inferior, in a single party 
dictatorship. To continue such patronage, these religious leaders garner support among the 
congregation. A personal dictatorship, rather than sharing with the religious opposition, excludes 
religious leaders. This dictatorship is better served by keeping the elites to a minimum size. In 
this case, the military and the wealthy become quintessential elites to thwart potential opposition. 
This dictatorship, therefore, receives little to no additional support from religious leaders. To test 
such a difference in dictatorship mechanics, I posit that: 
H2: When accounting for the Catholic and Islamic populace, survival likelihood further 
increases in a single party dictatorship. 
 
In order for a single party dictatorship to need Catholic and Islamic religious leaders to 
increase survival, these leaders need to pose a credible threat in terms of congregational size. If I 
am correct that at a certain congregational size, a single party dictatorship coopts religious 
leaders and these religious leaders react by garnering congregational support, I expect to see that 
this added support equates to an increase in survival likelihood. Moreover, if I am correct that a 
personal dictatorship excludes religious leaders in the opposition, they are not receiving support 
and should therefore have a lower survival likelihood than a single party dictatorship, all things 
being equal. 
Operationalization 
To test such a hypothesis, I organize my data by type of dictatorship-dictatorship failure and 
run a Cox hazard model using the year of failure as the observed event. A Cox hazard model 
allows for my analysis to determine the hazard rate which is the likelihood of an event happening 
– the risk of failure (Long 1997). As the coefficient for the hazard rate goes down, the risk of 
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failure goes down; conversely, the survival rate goes up (Long 1997).  I include observations 
from 1990 to 2012. If the dictatorship was on going before 1990, it is included in the analysis.   
Dependent Variable - Dictatorship Survival: I create my dependent variable by using Geddes, 
Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz (2013) data on autocratic breakdown and dictatorship 
transitions. From this data set, I use cases from Sub-Saharan African dictatorships from 1990 to 
2012. I create a dichotomous variable to represent whether or not the dictatorship failed in a 
specific year; 0 being on-going dictatorship (no failure) and 1 being dictatorship failure. The 
time for survival is therefore measured in years. The unit of analysis is dictatorship-year.37 
Independent Variables: 
Single/Personal: From the GFW (2013) data, I code a dichotomous variables for a single party 
dictatorship as a 1 and a personal dictatorship as a 0 depending on the data’s classification. 
Catholics and Muslims: I use the Religious Denomination variable from the Quality of 
Governance data set to account for these two variables. These variables provide percentages for 
each state’s population as either Catholic or Muslim. 
Control Variables: 
Exogenous Shocks: Geddes (2003) finds that exogenous shocks affect each a dictatorship’s 
survival. In Geddes’ (2003) testing, she includes two economic variables for state level economic 
issues and general economic trends. Following Geddes (2003), I include from the World Bank 
GDP per Capita Current US $ and GDP per Capita Annual Growth.  
Elections: Magaloni (2006; 2008) finds that a dictatorship can use elections to increase survival. 
To control for such a possibility, I rely on the African Elections Database for this variable.  This 
database is created and maintained by the African Studies Centre in the Netherlands. It records 
                                                          
37 I also reran the Cox hazard model with the time being measured in months. The reported results in this chapter 
remain consistent when changing the time period to months. 
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the type of election and when it took place from 1960 to 2012. I code these data as 0 if no 
elections took place, 1 if elections took place.  
Natural Resources: A debate exists as to whether or not natural resources help or hinder a 
dictatorship’s survival. To account for natural resources, I include from the World Bank Data 
mineral rents as percentage of GDP.38 
Military: To control for the military repression capabilities, I include from the World Bank data 
the total armed forces personnel.39 
Ethnicity: With Sub-Saharan Africa’s borders being drawn by Europeans with little regard to 
ethnicity or language (Herbst 2000), I need to control for the power of one ethnic identity over 
another to ensure that it is religious leaders and not tribal leaders as well as congregations and 
not tribal affiliations that might change a dictatorship’s survival expectation. I use the Quality of 
Governance’s Ethnic Fractionalization Measurement. This measurement “reflects probability 
that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno 
linguistic group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized a society is. The definition of 
ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics.”40 This variable allows 
for a distinction between religious affiliations and tribal affiliations. 
Results41 
 
                                                          
38 Ideally, I would like to include Oil as well. Due to lack of observations, any use of the Oil variables from the 
World Bank Data drops my observations to 8 and no results are possible.  
39 I also used military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The results were similar to the ones reported in this 
chapter but decreased my observations. For this reason, I report my results using total armed forces.  
40 Toerell et al. (2011). 
41 States included in the analysis: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, 
Guinea, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritania, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Namibia, 
Senegal, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. I have also rerun the analyses 
including variables for population, state size, colonial heritage, and region. None of these variables show 
significance or affect the reported results. For this reason, I did not include these variables in the reported results.  
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The results for hypothesis 1 (Model 1) confirm the general scholarly thought that a single 
party dictatorship’s ability to gain cooperation from the opposition sets it apart from a personal 
dictatorship’s exclusion of the opposition in terms of survival. Without accounting for Catholics 
                                                          
42 Including total armed forces causes one observation from Cote D’Ivoire and all of Somalia to drop out of the 
analysis. In the appendices for Chapter 5, Table 5.A has the religious break down for each state and Table 5.B has 
the leadership history and  the leaders’ religious affiliation for each state. 
Table 5.0: Dictatorship Survival42     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Single/Personal -.902*** 
(.537) 
-1.554*** 
(.571) 
-1.473** 
(.635) 
-1.470*** 
(.589) 
-1.335** 
(.621) 
-1.017** 
(.564) 
-.919 
(.563) 
Catholics _____ -.084*** 
(.030) 
-.086*** 
(.035) 
-.056*** 
(.019) 
-.055*** 
(.017) 
_____ _____ 
Muslims _____ -.015 
(.011) 
-.015 
(.012) 
_____ _____ .011 
(.008) 
.008 
(.008) 
GDP per Capita Current 
US $ 
-.003** 
(.001) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
-.004*** 
(.001) 
GDP per Capita Annual 
Growth 
-.001 
(.014) 
-.003 
(.010) 
.000 
(.010) 
-.002 
(.011) 
.002 
(.012) 
-.001 
(.015) 
.006 
(.012) 
Elections .290 
(.606) 
.197 
(.608) 
-.027 
(.647) 
.042 
(.574) 
-.183 
(.612) 
.177 
(.571) 
-.368 
(.619) 
Ethnicity -.192 
(1.691) 
-.013 
(1.863) 
-.698 
(1.921) 
.017 
(1.941) 
-.574 
(2.020) 
-.058 
(1.841) 
.264 
(2.031) 
Mineral Rents as % of 
GDP 
.015 
(.044) 
-.040 
(.051) 
-.043 
(.055) 
-.040 
(.050) 
-.037 
(.054) 
-.006 
(.047) 
.009 
(.050) 
Military _____ _____ .000 
(.000) 
_____ .000 
(.000) 
_____ .000 
(.000) 
N 
***= 99%, **= 95% 
46 46 44 46 44 46 44 
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and Muslims, the coefficient of -.902 indicates that as a basis of analysis, a single party 
dictatorship, in general, is 71 percent more likely to survival than a personal dictatorship.  
When including the Catholic and Muslim population variables (Model 3), the coefficient 
rises from -.902 to -1.473. The coefficient for Model 3 indicates that a single party dictatorship is 
81 percent more likely to survive; the addition of religious variables increases the likelihood of 
survival.43 Acknowledging religion in a survival analysis increases the survival rate for a single 
party dictatorship. This finding supports hypothesis 2 and my overall argument that Catholic and 
Islamic religious leaders, due to potential control abilities over congregations, merit inclusion in 
a survival analysis; these leaders can affect survival. 
To ascertain if one religion affects the survival rate more so than the other, I rerun all models 
and isolate the Catholic and Muslim populace (Model 5 and Model 7). The results show that the 
Catholic populace remains significant to the analysis whereas the Muslim populace shows no 
significance. As to the effects of each religion on a single party dictatorship’s survival rate, 
excluding Muslims and focusing on Catholics leads to similar results as when both variables are 
included together in the analysis; the survival coefficient is significant and similar in size. The 
Muslim populace has no significance and its effects on the survival rate when included in the 
analysis are minimal.  
From these findings, I surmise that the Catholic populace is what alters the survival rate 
when included in the analysis; Muslims have minimal effects, if any. This finding confirms the 
expectations with respect to Catholics for hypothesis 2 by indicating that if included in a single 
party dictatorship, Catholics alter survival expectations. 
                                                          
43 For the remainder of my analysis of the results, I am relying on the results that include all of the control variables. 
The dropping of two observations does not significantly impact the reported results. 
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Catholic Populace applied to the Results 
To show how a Catholic populace size affects the survival expectations for single party and 
personal dictatorships, I apply the results by pairing countries single party and personal 
dictatorship with similar Catholic populations.   
When pairing states with ongoing dictatorships and similar Catholic percentages, Table 5.2 
shows the effects on each dictatorship of the Catholic populace on dictatorship survival 
compared to expected survival rate without accounting for the Catholic populace.44 These results 
show the difference of the effects of religious leaders on congregations depending on whether or 
not such leaders are in the opposition or treated as elites. With Sub-Saharan African religious 
societies being highly fractionalized, the results for the Republic of Congo, a personal 
dictatorship with 53.9 percent Catholics, and Angola, a single party dictatorship with 68.5 
percent Catholics, show a very similar survival rate expectation. Plausibly, due to religious 
                                                          
44 To calculate these percentages, I rely on the Cox model that reports a -1.335 coefficient for dictatorship type and -
.055 coefficient for Catholic populace. The percentage of Catholics comes from the Quality of Governance’s 
religious denominations data and the dictatorship type classification comes from the GFW data. These state’s 
dictatorships are all ongoing as of 2009. 
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fractionalization and the size of the Catholic populace being large, both states’ benefit from 
including Catholic leaders as elites; the benefits outweigh the costs due to size of the 
congregation. This reasoning reforms my argument in that due to such fractionalization, the 
requisite amount of congregational size that religious leaders need to be part of the elites is 
plausibly lower than previously theorized; at some point, both dictatorships cannot ignore 
religious leaders and must include such leaders as elites due to congregational size.  
When looking at the difference between Mozambique, a single party dictatorship, and 
Cameroon, a personal dictatorship, the analysis becomes clearer (Table 5.2). Catholic leaders are 
in the opposition (Serapiao 1993; Takougang 2004; 2004a). Paul Biya, the personal dictator of 
Cameroon focuses on maintaining control over the state with using the military’s repressive 
capabilities at will (Takounga 2004; 2004a). Catholic Cardinals criticize Biya’s leadership and 
preach in opposition to Biya (Takougang 2004; 2004a). No indication exists to suggest at any 
time that Paul Biya included Catholic leaders as elites; the evidence indicates that these leaders 
are routinely excluded and repressed (Takougang 2004; 2004a). The Catholic Church and its 
leaders in Mozambique, a single party dictatorship, have had a different treatment during 
FRELIMO’s duration, the main party of Mozambique. From independence in Mozambique, the 
head of FRELIMO, Machel (1976-1986) viewed the Catholic Church and its leaders as being in 
cahoots with the Portuguese colonial administration (Serapiao 1993). Machel tried to punish 
church by outlawing the religion and seizing its property; Catholic leaders were, thus, in the 
opposition (Serapiao 1993). This policy created strife for Machal due to the large portion of the 
populace that was devout Catholics. Catholic leaders did not disappear but rather acted against 
the dictatorship by organizing its congregations to defy the dictatorship (Serapiao 1993). Such 
strife led to the liberalization of opposition parties and the change of FRELIMO’s party leader to 
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Chissano (1986-2005).45 During Chissano’s leadership, the Catholic leaders allied with 
oppositional parties. With such alliance and these Catholic leaders’ congregational size, 
Chissano began offering concessions to Catholic leaders. Catholic leaders have received property 
back and an official status as a religion in the state as well as some level of state support 
(Serapiao 1993).  
With Cameroon and Mozambique having similar amount of Catholics and both being in the 
opposition, I conclude that the difference in survival rate stems from the above noted difference 
in how each dictatorship treats the opposition: Cameroon excludes and Mozambique coopts 
Catholic leaders in the opposition. Moreover, the evidence indicates that since Mozambique has 
coopted Catholic leaders, the state has had less strife and the Catholic populace supports the 
dictatorship (Serapiao 1993).      
From the Mozambique and Cameroon cases, as the size of the Catholic populace drops, the 
results show a growing difference in survival rate between a single party and a personal 
dictatorship. I reason that these results support my theoretical position that this change is due to 
how each dictatorship type treats the religious leaders in the opposition. For a single party 
dictatorship, offering these religious leaders in the opposition some form of inferior patronage to 
gain the Catholic populace’s support accounts for the difference in the survival rates between 
both types of dictatorship; depending on the Catholic populace’s size posing a credible threat to 
the dictatorship. This support aids in my general argument by showing a basis of when a 
dictatorship includes religious leaders as elites. Furthermore, these results show support for how 
a potential difference in treatment of Catholic religious leaders in the opposition exists. With a 
single party dictatorship having the ability to coopt such religious leaders, whereas a personal 
dictatorship likely excludes such leaders, the inclusion of such leaders creates support among the 
                                                          
45 The current head of the party, Guebuza has continued to give Catholic leaders concessions (Serapiao 1993). 
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Catholic populace. Such support equates to the difference in the survival rate between the two 
dictatorship types when Catholic leaders are in the opposition and their congregations pose a 
credible threat. 
Implications 
These results indicate that ignoring religion from a survival analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa 
hinders results. With the African populace being particularly devout, religion has a role to play. 
The results indicate that Catholic religious leaders have a role to play in a single party 
dictatorship’s survival. As opposition, this type of dictatorship can coopt these religious leaders 
for additional support to help extend the duration of the dictatorship if these leaders’ 
congregational size poses a credible threat. 
Although the inclusion of Catholics as a variable increases a single party’s overall survival, 
the actual effects of the Catholic populace’s coefficient shows that these effects are dependent on 
the size of the Catholic population in each state. I reason that such effects support the notion that 
these leaders, when in the opposition, become coopted if the congregational size poses a credible 
threat and become elites in both dictatorship types when the adhering populace is of such a size 
that the exclusion of Catholic leaders would be irrational. With the decision of elites being 
strategic on the part of the dictatorship, barring a substantial effect on the part of the Catholic 
populace, inclusion of Catholic leaders as elites is irrational for a dictatorship; the benefits are 
too slight. From such a stance, these findings imply that Catholic religious leaders in the 
opposition are only of interest to a single party dictatorship if the Catholic populace poses a 
credible threat; only single party dictatorship has the mechanics to coopt these leaders and gain 
the cooperation.    
Alternative Explanation 
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Even though I surmise that the results support my overall argument, the results show that the 
amount of Catholics, regardless of dictatorship type, is significant to a survival analysis. The 
means of testing make it difficult to ascertain if this populace is significant to only one 
dictatorship type or the other. This finding challenges my argument by showing that the mere 
presence of Catholics increases both dictatorships’ survival rate. 
Although this result appears problematic, my reasoning remains sound due to a lack of 
differences in religious affiliations of dictatorship leaders and populace between both 
dictatorship types.46 Catholic religious leaders, and congregations, plausibly have some level of 
good will to a Catholic dictatorship leader. With Africa having the highest level of religious 
fractionalization and the size of the Catholic populace in each state not always being the 
plurality, Catholic leaders may consistently worry about the status of their religion within a state. 
Catholic leaders and thus their congregations plausibly might feel some level of safety with a 
Catholic head of state. With the head of state being part of Catholicism, Catholic leaders and 
congregations have an expectation that someone of the like faith would not cause harm to fellow 
brethren.  
When looking at the correlation between duration of dictatorship type and the dictatorship 
having a Catholic affiliated dictator, a single party dictatorship has a Catholic dictator 39 percent 
of the time whereas a personal dictatorship has a Catholic dictator 36 percent of the time, while 
both have an average Catholic populace of 21 and 25 percent, respectively.47 This populace is of 
potential equal importance to both dictatorships and has potential for similar connection and 
feeling between dictators of the same faith and Catholics religious leaders and their 
congregations. With both of these relatively equal, I would not expect the inclusion of the 
                                                          
46 I am not equating dictatorship survival to leader survival. My research remains focused on dictatorship survival. 
Rather, I am estimating the duration of time that each dictatorship had a leader that affiliates with Catholicism.  
47 The appendix has a comprehensive list of dictatorship leaders and their religious affiliation.  
82 
 
Catholic populace in a survival analysis to have a larger increase in a single party’s survival rate 
if it were not for Catholic religious leaders being treated differently. The significance of 
Catholics, therefore, for both a single party and a personal dictatorship likely has some level of 
goodwill toward the heads of states affiliated with the Catholic religion. With the total duration 
of Catholic affiliated heads of state in power being the largest out of all the religions, the 
significance of the Catholic coefficient is likely equating to the good will in both dictatorships, 
but the overall increase in single party survival is likely due to the single party coopting Catholic 
religious leaders whose congregational size poses a credible threat. 
Conclusion 
The results in this chapter show that general scholarly thought that a single party dictatorship 
has the ability to coopt critics and that such an ability extends its survival rate to that of a 
personal dictatorship is true. However, I extend this analysis by showing the effects of religious 
factors on a single party dictatorship’s survival rate. My results indicate that if a Catholic 
populace poses a credible threat to a single party dictatorship, this dictatorship likely includes 
religious leaders in the opposition to gain the additional insurance of support from the leaders’ 
congregations. When including the Catholic populace into a survival analysis, the survival rate 
for a single party dictatorship increases. This finding confirms my overall argument that religious 
leaders and their congregations can alter a dictatorship’s survival, and that such a change is due 
to how each dictatorship type treats religious leaders in the opposition; a single party dictatorship 
likely coopts whereas a personal dictatorship likely excludes. The different treatment explains 
why, when accounting for the Catholic populace, a single party dictatorship’s survival rate 
increases and remains higher than that of a personal dictatorship. 
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This chapter has several avenues for possible future research. Religious variables are 
extremely limited. With my argument focusing on religious leaders and their effects on 
congregations, the collection of data that estimates the number of religious leaders in each state 
would help by allowing for an analysis to see if size is a factor. Potentially, too many religious 
leaders make it difficult to coopt a religion. Moreover such data aid to allow a more in-depth 
analysis of religious leaders on a dictatorship’s survival rate.  
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Chapter 6: Sacred Dictators – Holy Conclusion 
Dictatorships continue to remain problematic to the democratic development and individual 
level freedoms in Sub-Saharan Africa. Scholars have not fully explained the mechanics of how 
these dictatorships have maintained power and legitimacy in this region of the world. By looking 
at the history of religion in the region and its power over the citizenry, scholars can better 
understand an additional nuance that allows dictatorships to continue. 
Religion’s saliency as an explanatory variable has had scant incorporation into comparative 
political science research. At best, scholars use it to control for issues without recognizing the 
importance it plays in an analysis. In this research, I argue for the inclusion of religious 
explanatory variables; religious variables create a substantial difference to research outcomes in 
places like Sub-Saharan Africa. This research shows that by excluding religious factors in a 
dictatorship survival analysis between a single party and personal dictatorship in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, results fail to account for an important nuance. 
In Geddes’ (2003) research on dictatorship survival, she uses a control variable for Muslims 
to account for previous scholars noting an association between countries that are predominantly 
Muslim and weak democratic values. To control for this effect, she uses the population 
percentage of Muslims in each country. She offers little to no insight in the analysis as to why 
the predominance of this religion shows significance in her results. I contend that this lack of 
analysis is due to a fundamental dismissal of religion as a focal point in comparative politics. 
In this chapter, I begin by outlining Chapter 1 and explain how former colonial rulers used 
religion and its religious leaders Sub-Saharan Africa. I further explain how the saliency of 
religion has not disappeared among these Sub-Saharan African dictatorships. In my Chapter 2 
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outline, I discuss Geddes’ (2003) research and how my contribution is the addition of religion 
and religious leader explanatory variables and an explication of how these variables change 
dictatorship survival in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 3 begins the analysis of my argument by 
showing that religious leaders have control over congregations in Sub-Saharan Africa and are, 
thus, a potential means for a dictatorship to use to extend survival. Chapter 4 turns to the 
differences between a single party and personal dictatorship and discusses how each type of 
dictatorship treats religious leaders. This chapter shows how religious leaders garner support 
among congregations for a dictatorship. Chapter 5 offers a survival analysis with the inclusion of 
religion to show how the garnering of support noted in Chapter 4 translates into appreciable 
survival differences for a dictatorship. I conclude this chapter by my restating my argument that 
religion matters and explaining avenues for future research. 
Chapter 1: Holy Introduction 
In Chapter 1 of my research, I explain how the European colonial powers used religion and 
its religious leaders in the colonial administration to provide services for citizens; privileging 
religious leaders, in many cases, with colonial administration positions. By the European powers 
interweaving religion and politics, emerging Sub-Saharan dictators learned the usefulness of 
religion and religious leaders in maintaining order. The question remains as to the saliency post-
independence of this dictatorship-religious leader connection. To address such a question, I show 
that the current situation in Sub-Saharan Africa is one in which the saliency of religion is high; 
high levels of religious membership and religiosity exist. I reason that with the colonial 
experience teaching future dictators the usefulness of religion to maintain order and with current 
levels of religiosity and membership being high, religion and religious leaders are as much of 
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importance now as they were in colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. By ignoring religion and religious 
leaders, scholars fail to capture the in its entirety the mechanics behind dictatorship survival.  
Chapter 2: Holy Argument 
Having shown in Chapter 1 the importance of religion and religious leaders in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Chapter 2 outlines Geddes’ (2003) research and how my argument of how religion and 
religious leaders work in a dictatorship survival analysis – the contribution to the literature of 
this research. Geddes’ (2003) classifies dictatorships based on who has policymaking decisions. 
Two classifications, important to Sub-Saharan Africa, are a single party dictatorship and a 
personal dictatorship. In Geddes’ (2003) analysis, she claims that single party dictatorships are 
more likely to survive than personal dictatorships due to how each treats the opposition. With 
single party dictatorships having a party apparatus, these dictatorships can coopt opposition into 
the party structure whereas a personal dictatorship relies on a small core of elites – the wealthy 
and military - to insulate it from the opposition. This distinction, according to Geddes (2003), is 
the reason why single party dictatorships survive longer; peaceful incorporation of the opposition 
leads to more stability whereas personal dictatorships’ reliance on repression of the opposition 
leads to destabilization. I agree with Geddes’ (2003) distinction and reasoning but argue that 
religion needs to be included as an explanatory factor in the analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
I argue that dictatorships use religious leaders to garner support for the dictatorship among 
congregations depending on the strength of the religious leaders’ congregation. I agree with 
Geddes (2003) that either type of dictatorship includes religious leaders as elites when the 
benefits of including these religious leaders outweigh the costs. I reason that this inclusion 
occurs when the religious leaders have a near majority of followers within a country: the benefits 
of religious leaders supplying support from nearly the entire populace outweigh the costs of 
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either excluding the religious leaders who have a small or insignificant amount of followers or 
angering elites. None of the Sub-Saharan African countries in my sample has a near majority of 
followers subscribing to one faith. Therefore, I reason that religious leaders are in the opposition 
regardless of type of dictatorship. In accordance with Geddes’ (2003) research expectation that 
only single party dictatorships coopt the opposition, I expect that only single party dictatorships 
incorporate religious leaders if these religious leaders’ congregational size can pose a threat to 
the dictatorship’s stability. For this reason, single party dictatorships that include religious 
leaders are likely to survive the longest in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
An additional nuance to my argument exists and that nuance concerns which religions matter 
in the cost benefit analysis of a dictatorship. I reason that the focal point is on Catholicism and 
Islam. Both of these religions are hierarchical (Englebert 2000; Philpott 2007). The hierarchy 
makes these religions more affordable for a dictatorship to include because the dictatorship only 
needs to buy off the head religious leaders who will demand compliance from subordinates to 
preach support for the dictatorship. 
Chapter 3: Holy Control 
Having outlined my argument in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 clarifies why religious leaders would 
be of interest to dictatorships; religious leaders’ level have control over congregations and can 
garner support for dictatorships among congregations. To show support for religious leaders’ 
congregational control, I use the scholarly thought on Secularization Theory. 
This theory reasons that in a society that is pre-industrialization, religious leaders provide 
survival services to the populace – healthcare, food and education (Martin 1978). Failing to listen 
to religious leaders makes the individual ineligible to ascertain services – adherence has its 
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privileges. Once industrialization takes place, individuals become more survival secure; more 
jobs equate to steady cash flow and steady cash flow means less need to listen to religious 
leaders due to the cash flow providing individuals with access to survival services independent of 
religious leaders. As industrialization continues, individuals demand that the state provide such 
services. The end outcome is that the state supplants religious leaders’ influence by 
institutionalizing access to services once provided by these religious leaders (Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). 
I approach the testing in this chapter by looking at the micro-level effects, country-level 
effects and macro-level effects.48 
Micro-Level Effects 
The micro level attempts to show Secularization Theory effects on individual level survival 
security; an inverse relationship between individual level food security and religious leaders’ 
influence over the individual. The results show significance for only Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
Tanzania shows no support for Secularization Theory because the expected effect is opposite; 
Tanzanians contact religious leaders more often when their food security increases. Zimbabwe 
does go in the expected direction but has some complicating factors that I reason are affecting 
the results; food output is plummeting due to the dictator’s meddling into the economy not due to 
industrialization. For these reasons, I find that the results for hypothesis 1 show no support for 
Secularization Theory. 
With the results showing no support for Secularization Theory, I surmise that religious 
leaders have control over their congregations. These dictatorships have little to no levels of 
                                                          
48 I use the Afrobarometer 2008 Round 4 survey data for Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe throughout Chapter 3. 
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development indicating that industrialization has not occurred. Without industrialization, 
religious leaders’ control over congregations exists (Martin 1978). 
Country-Level Effects 
The country-level effects attempt to show if there are unique attributes to certain societies in 
the sample that make religious leaders’ influence more likely by including country dichotomous 
variables into the same analysis for micro-level effects. The results show no support for 
Secularization Theory; food security is insignificant. Burkina Faso, Uganda and Mozambique 
show positive, negative and positive significance respectively. 
With the country-level effects showing no support for Secularization Theory, I reason that 
this result supports the micro-level results; religious leaders have congregational control due to 
these societies being in a pre-industrialization situation. The results for Burkina Faso, Uganda 
and Mozambique show dictatorships that are potentially mimicking the former colonial 
governments. French and Portuguese colonies gave religious leaders an administrative role in the 
societies. Burkina Faso, a former French colony, and Mozambique, a former Portuguese colony, 
have societies where religious leaders were and are still important to present day. With Uganda 
being landlocked and a former British colony, the negative results are likely exhibiting the 
British colonial style; control the coast and let certain religious leaders control the interior. 
Religious leaders’ control in Uganda may be different due to it being landlocked and a former 
British colony. 
Macro-Level Effects 
The macro-level looks at development and its connection to religious leaders’ control. The 
results show no support for Secularization Theory because the directionality goes against 
expectation: the more developed a country is the more often a religious leader is contacted.  
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These results further support all the previous results; development is not sufficient to lead to 
industrialization. With no industrialization, Secularization Theory expects that religious leaders 
have congregational control. 
Implications of Chapter 3 
With no clear results in favor of Secularization Theory, this chapter shows a pre-
Secularization Theory situation. These countries have not developed sufficiently either to spurn 
industrialization. Without industrialization, religious leaders’ control does not diminish; religious 
leaders do have congregational control.  
By having religious leaders having control, religious leaders, if coalesced into a dictatorship, 
can influence their congregations. This influence supplies a dictatorship with support. In further 
support of the importance of religious leaders, the control variable for religious membership 
consistently shows significance. With Chapter 1 indicating high levels of religious membership, 
these religious leaders can affect a large portion of the populace and sway this populace to 
support a dictatorship.   
 Therefore, religious leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa can change a dictatorship’s survival 
depending on how the dictatorship treats the religious leaders. In addition to the saliency of 
religious leaders for a dictatorship survival analysis, this chapter further underscores my overall 
advocacy for the incorporation of religious variables when looking at political phenomenon in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Although this chapter shows support for religious leaders’ congregational 
control being countrywide, European colonizers and subsequently Sub-Saharan African 
dictatorships, invested unevenly between the coast and interior; future research should focus on 
if religious leaders’ congregational control is countrywide or in specific areas. 
Chapter 4: Holy Support: Catholic and Islamic Leader and Member Dictatorship Support 
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Having shown support for religious leaders having control over congregations in Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 combines Geddes’ (2003) distinction that only single party dictatorships can coopt the 
opposition and my argument in favor of religious leaders being included in the analysis. With the 
sample being the same from Chapter 3, no country has a majority religion; therefore, religious 
leaders are in the opposition. A single party dictatorship may decide based on a cost-benefit 
analysis, to coopt religious leaders in exchange for congregational support for the single party 
dictatorship. I further advocate that dictatorships only choose Catholic or Islamic religious 
leaders due to the hierarchical nature of these religions. This hierarchy makes these religions, and 
the respective religious leaders, the least costly for a dictatorship to gain the maximum of 
benefits; a dictatorship need only include the head religious leader who can then command 
subordinates to do his bidding. I, thus, focus on Catholic and Islamic religious leaders in this 
chapter. 
Religious Leaders’ Support for Single Party Dictatorships 
If religious leaders are being coopted in a single party dictatorship and excluded in a personal 
dictatorship, these coopted religious leaders should show more support for a single party 
dictatorship than counterparts should in a personal dictatorship. The results show this situation to 
be true; Catholic and Islamic religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are significantly 
more likely to support the dictatorship than these same religious leaders in a personal 
dictatorship.  
This difference in religious leaders’ support dependent on the type of dictatorship implies 
that single party dictatorships are treating religious leaders differently than personal 
dictatorships; these religious leaders are receiving something to support the single party 
dictatorship. This finding underscores my argument that religious leaders are being coopted 
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when needed by a single party dictatorship and that religious leaders do have a role to play in a 
dictatorship. It further aids my argument that the focal point should be on Catholicism and Islam 
because these religious leaders show a higher likelihood of support than other religious leaders.   
Religious Members’ Support for Single Party Dictatorships 
If religious leaders in a single party dictatorship are being coopted for support, reason 
indicates that a connection should exists between these religious leaders and congregational 
support; this support is the benefit the single party dictatorship wants that minimizes the costs of 
coopting religious leaders. The results show that Catholic and Muslim members in a single party 
dictatorship are significantly more likely to support the dictatorship. The expected connection 
does exist.  
By the results showing a connection between religious leaders and members of the same 
religion in support of a single party dictatorship, these results add credence to the findings in 
Chapter 3 that religious leaders do have control over congregations. In addition to this control, 
these results also indicate that a single party dictatorship is coopting religious leaders in the 
opposition in exchange for congregational support for the dictatorship. This finding further 
emboldens my advocacy for the addition of religious variables in a dictatorship survival analysis 
in Sub-Saharan Africa; religious leaders do have a role to play. 
Implications of Chapter 4 
I reason that these results are due to Catholic and Muslim leaders in a single party 
dictatorship likely receiving some form of patronage to provide support for the dictatorship. To 
continue such payment, these religious leaders must influence their respective congregations to 
support the dictatorship. With the results indicating that the active religious members of each 
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respective religion are significantly more likely to support the single party dictatorship, I believe 
that these religious leaders are indeed preaching support and that the congregations are reacting.  
This chapter aids my overall argument by showing that religious leaders in a single party 
dictatorship are acting differently than religious leaders in a personal dictatorship. I reason that 
this difference is due how each treats the opposition. As noted by Geddes (2003), single party 
dictatorships coopt the opposition whereas personal dictatorships exclude the opposition. In 
addition, this chapter shows a connection between religious leaders and their congregations in 
terms of support. Future research should focus on what exact benefits are being given to religious 
leaders to see if differing levels of benefits connect to differing levels of congregational support.  
Chapter 5: Holy Survival – Catholic and Islamic Effects on a Dictatorship’s Survival 
Having found support for religious leaders controlling congregations, being incorporated into 
a single party dictatorship and garnering support among congregations, Chapter 5 turns to how 
the previous chapters’ findings change a dictatorship survival expectation. Geddes (2003) 
researches the difference in survival between a single party and personal dictatorship across the 
world. My first step in this chapter is to see if this same difference exists when looking at Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Dictatorship Survival Expectations in Sub-Saharan Africa    
With much of my research and evidence showing that, in general, Sub-Saharan Africa has 
some unique attributes, I begin this chapter by confirming Geddes (2003). The results show that 
single party dictatorships are more likely to survive than personal dictatorships.  
These results indicate that Geddes’ (2003) approach remains consistent when honing in on 
Sub-Saharan Africa. With her approach showing similar results in Sub-Saharan Africa, I believe 
that her explanation that the survival difference between single party and personal dictatorships 
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surrounds how each treats the opposition – only a single party can coopt the opposition leading 
to higher survival likelihood – is justified. This finding further aids my research by providing a 
basis of analysis to apply religious variables to see how religious variables change the survival 
expectation.  
Dictatorship Survival Expectations with Religious Variables 
Using Geddes’ (2003) approach, I add variables for the percentage of Catholics and Muslims 
for each country. The results show significance for Catholics but no significance for Muslims. 
These results show that a single party dictatorship with Catholics is more likely to survive than a 
single party without and even more likely to survive than a personal dictatorship with or without 
Catholics.  
The results in this chapter indicate that the Catholic religion and the presence of Catholics 
can change a dictatorship’s survival expectations; making a single party dictatorship with 
Catholics the likelihood to survive the longest. Chapter 4 showed that Catholic religious leaders 
and Catholic congregations have a higher likelihood of support for a single party dictatorship 
than counterparts in a personal dictatorship. This chapter’s results show that this support 
connection in a single party dictatorship translates into higher survival likelihood for this type of 
dictatorship. Although Chapter 4 showed a similar connection between Muslim religious leaders 
and Muslim congregations, the failure for this connection to show results in this chapter does not 
imply that my argument is not fundamentally sound. Rather, I suspect that the lack of results in 
this chapter for Islam is due to a religious difference; Catholicism has no sub-sects whereas 
Islam has many. I think that in Chapter 4’s sample, some Islamic sects were over represented, 
making those results overstated.   
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Implications of Chapter 5 
This chapter aids my overall argument by showing that the inclusion of religious explanatory 
variables in a dictatorship survival analysis changes Geddes’ (2003) findings. The findings in 
this chapter show that there is a significant correlation between the proportion of Catholics in the 
populace and an increase in the likelihood for a single party dictatorship to survive. In addition to 
this specific finding regarding Catholics, this chapter indicates that Catholic religious leaders 
may have kept their privileges gained under European colonization until present day. Catholic 
leaders are gaining something to go against Papal doctrine that the Pope’s Church does not 
support dictatorships. This chapter has several areas for future research. The first area should 
focus on explaining this “Catholic” effect and what the exact difference is between this religion 
and others in Sub-Saharan African dictatorships. The second area should focus on the lack of 
results for Muslims in this chapter and see if there are certain Muslim sects that have the 
expected affect.   
Significance of Research 
This research advocates that religion should be included in comparative politics as an 
explanatory variable. Not including it, when merited, leads to results that have less saliency. The 
Sub-Saharan African society is one where religion plays a strong role and by ignoring this role, I 
have shown that expectations for dictatorship survival are less accurate. Geddes (2003), although 
a good baseline for researching dictatorship survival, needs to include religious variables in 
regions where religion has high levels of followers and religiosity; there is more to a dictatorship 
survival analysis than the type of dictatorship.  
Conclusion 
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Throughout my study, I have shown support that in Sub-Saharan Africa, religious leaders 
have control over congregations and that a connection exists between religious leaders’ support 
for a dictatorship and congregational support for a dictatorship. Religious leaders have a role to 
play in a dictatorship survival analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa. I have further shown evidence that 
including religion changes the expectations for single party dictatorship survival. With all of the 
evidence showing saliency for religious variables, my argument seems justified that Geddes 
(2003) and other scholars must incorporate such variables for dictatorship survival. Moreover, 
this study has shown that religion and religious leaders can and do play a role in dictatorship 
survival in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ignoring religion and religious leaders in a Sub-Saharan African 
study limits the study’s explanatory ability.  
Future research into this topic should focus on field research and specifically target religious 
communities and the religious leaders’ ability to influence such communities. In addition to this 
connection, field research can also clarify religious leaders’ support for dictatorships. Apart from 
these possibilities for future research, two other avenues exist to help clarify the effects shown in 
this study; religious size and exogenous shocks. To show a baseline and advocate for religious 
leader inclusion, I have had to leave out how these dictatorships may use religious leaders in 
times of exogenous shocks. This area of research would help clarify the mechanisms behind the 
decision of when and whether or not to include religious leaders for additional support for the 
dictatorship. I have also had to leave in question the level of exact size that matters for 
dictatorships to consider a religion and its leaders as a credible threat. Research into this area of 
the topic would help clarify the expectation of when a dictatorship includes religious leaders.     
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Appendix Chapter 3 
Afrobarometer Round 4 Questions 
The individual level survey data come from the Afrobarometer Round 4 collected on each country between 2006-
2008. 
Dependant Variable: Contact Religious Leader 
Question Number: Q27A Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following 
persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A religious leader? Variable Label: Contact 
religious leader Values: 0-3, 9, 998, -1 Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t 
know, 998=Refused to answer, 1=Missing data Source. 
Independent Variables: 
Religious Membership: 
Question Number: Q22A Question: Let’s turn to your role in the community. Now I am going to read out a list of 
groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active 
member, an inactive member, or not a member: A religious group (e.g., church, mosque)? Variable Label: Member 
of religious group Values: 0-3, 9, 998, -1 Value Labels: 0=Not a Member, 1=Inactive member, 2=Active member, 
3=Official leader, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data. 
Note:  I exclude Leaders. 
Food Security: 
Question Number: Q8A Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone 
without: Enough food to eat? Variable Label: How often gone without food Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1Value Labels: 
0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, 
-1=Missing data Source. 
Note: I reverse this coding. 
Control Variables: 
Catholic and Muslim: 
Question Number: Q90 Question: What is your religion, if any?  Variable Label: Religion of respondent Values: 0, 
1-30, 140-143, 420-421, 461-465, 500-504, 580, 620, 660, 700-701, 995,998-999, -1 Value Labels: 0=None, 
1=Christian only (i.e., respondents says only “Christian”, without identifying a specific subgroup), 2=Roman 
Catholic, 3=Orthodox, 4=Coptic, 5=Anglican, 6=Lutheran, 7=Methodist, 8=Presbyterian, 9=Baptist , 
10=Quaker/Friends, 11=Mennonite, 12=Evangelical, 13=Pentecostal ( e.g.,“Born Again” and/or “Saved”), 
14=Independent (e.g., “African Independent Church”), 15=Jehovah’s Witness, 16=Seventh Day Adventist, 
17=Mormon, 18=Muslim only (i.e., respondents says only “Muslim”, without identifying a specific subgroup), 
19=Sunni only (i.e., respondents says only “Sunni Muslim”, without identifying a specific sub-group), 20=Ismaeli, 
21=Mouridiya Brotherhood, 22=Tijaniya Brotherhood, 23=Qadiriya Brotherhood, 24=Shia,  25=Traditional/ethnic 
religion, 26=Hindu, 27=Bahai, 28=Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God), 29=Atheist (Do not believe in a God), 
30=Other Chrtistian (Moravian), 140=Dutch Reform, 141=UCCSA, 142=ZCC, 143=IPCC, 420=Calviniste (FJKM), 
421=Jesosy Mamonjy, 461=Sukuti, 462=African Abraham, 463=Church of Christ, 464=Apostolic Faith/New 
United, 465=Last Church/Reform, 500=Trabiya Brotherhood, 501=Hamadiya (Hamalite) Brotherhood , 
502=Wahhabiya Brotherhood, 504=Sidya, 580=Dutch Reformed, 620=Izala, 660=Layenes brotherhood, 
700=Zionist Christian Church, 701=Dutch Reformed, 995=Other, 998=Refused to answer, 999=Don’t know, -
1=Missing data  Source. 
Note: I use response 2 for Catholic and response 18 for Muslim. 
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Age: 
Question Number: Q1 Question: How old are you? Variable Label: Age Values: 18-110, 998-999, -1 Value Labels: 
998=Refused to answer, 999=Don’t know, -1=Missing data. 
Gender: 
Question Number: Q101 Question: Respondent’s gender Variable Label: Gender of respondent Values: 1, 2 Value  
Note: The Afrobarometer does have a question regarding the importance of religion in one’s life. I exclude this 
potential variable as a control variable because the Pearson correlation between it and religious membership is too 
highly correlated 
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Table 4.A State Information 
State GFW 
Classification 
Leader Party 
Burkina Faso  Personal Blaise 
Compaore 
Congres pour la Democratie et le Progres 
(CDP) 
Cameroon Personal Paul Biya People’s Democratic Movement (RDPC) 
Cote 
D’Ivoire 
Personal Alassane 
Ouattara 
Rassemblement des Republicains (RDR) 
Mozambique Single Party Armando 
Guebuza 
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) 
Tanzania Single Party Jakaya 
Kikwete 
Charma Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 
Togo Personal Faure 
Gnassingbe 
Rassemblement du Peuple Togoloais 
(UNIR) 
Uganda Personal Yoweri 
Musevini 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
Zambia Single Party Guy Scott Patriotic Front (PF) 
Zimbabwe Single Party Robert 
Mugabe 
Zimbabwe African Union-Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) 
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Table 4.B Likelihood of Catholic and Islamic Leader Dictatorship Support
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Table 5.A: State Catholic and Islamic Percentage From the Quality of Governance Data 
State Catholic Muslim State Catholic Muslim  
Angola 68.7 0 Lesotho 43.5 0  
Benin 18.5 15.2 Mali 0.7 80  
Burkina Faso 9 43 Madagascar 26 1.7  
Botswana 9.4 0 Mauritania 0.3 99.4  
Cameroon 35 22 Malawi 27.6 16.2  
Democratic Republic of Congo  48.4 1.4 Mozambique 31.4 13  
Cote D'Ivoire 18.5 24 Niger 0.2 87.9  
Chad 21 44 Namibia 19.1 0  
Central African Republic 95.9 0 Sudan 4.4 73  
Republic of Congo 53.9 0.4 Senegal 5.6 91  
Ethiopia 0.7 31.4 Somalia 0 99.8  
Guinea-Bissau 10.2 38.3 Sierra Leone 2.2 39.4  
Gambia 1.9 84.8 Togo 29.3 17  
Guinea 1.1 69 Tanzania 28.2 32.5  
Ghana 18.7 15.7 Uganda 49.6 6.6  
Kenya 26.4 6 Zambia 26.2 0.3  
Liberia 1.9 21.2 Zimbabwe 14.4 0.9  
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Table 5.B: Religious Affiliation of Leaders 
State Leader Time GFW Classification Religion 
Angola Antonio Agostinho Neto 1975-1979 Single Party Protestant (Methodist) 
 Jose Eduardo Dos Santos 1979-Pres. Single Party Catholic 
Benin Mathieu Kerekou 1973-1990 Personal Protestant (Evangelical) 
Botswana Seretese Khama 1967-1980 Single Party Protestant 
 Quett Masire 1980-1998 Single Party Protestant 
 Festus Mogae 1998-2008 Single Party Protestant 
 Ian Khama 2008-Pres. Single Party Protestant 
Burkina Faso Thomas Sankara 1983-1987 Personal Catholic 
 Blaise Compaore 1988-2008 Personal Catholic 
Cameroon Paul Biya 1984-Pres. Personal Catholic 
Central African 
Republic Francois Bozize 2004-Pres. Personal Catholic 
Chad Hissene Habre 1983-1990 Personal Muslim 
 Idriss Deby 1991-Pres. Personal Muslim 
Republic of Congo Denis Nguesso 1998-Pres. Personal Catholic 
Dem. Rep. of Congo Jospeh Mobutu 1961-1997 Personal Catholic 
 Laurent Kabila 1998-Pres. Personal Protestant (Anglican) 
Ethiopia Meles Zanawi 1992-1995 Single Party Orthodox 
 Negasso Gidada 1995-2001 Single Party Protestant 
 Girma Wolde-Giorgis 2001-2013 Single Party Orthodox 
Gambia Sir Dawda Jawara 1966-1994 Single Party Muslim 
 Yahya Jammeh 1995-Pres. Personal Muslim 
Ghana Jerry Rawlings 1982-2000 Personal Catholic 
Guinea Lansana Conte 1985-2008 Personal Muslim 
Guinea-Bissau Joao Vieira 1981-1999 Personal Catholic 
 Henrique Rosa 2003 Personal Catholic 
Cote D'Ivoire Felix Houphouet-Boigny 1961-1993 Single Party Catholic 
 Henri Bedie 1993-1999 Single Party Catholic 
 Robert Guei 2000 Personal Catholic 
 Laurent Gbagbo 2001-2011 Personal Catholic 
Kenya Jomo Kenyata 1964-1979 Single Party 
Protestant 
(Presbyterian) 
 Daniel Arap Moi 1979-2002 Single Party 
Protestant (Af. Inland 
Church) 
Liberia Samuel Doe 1981-1990 Personal Protestant (Baptist) 
 Charles Taylor 1998-2003 Personal Judaism 
Madagascar Didier Ratsiraka 1976-1993` Personal Unknown 
Malawi Hastings Banda 1965-1994 Personal 
Protestant 
(Presbyterian) 
Mali Moussa Traore 1969-1991 Personal Muslim 
Mauritania Maaouya Taya 1984-2005 Personal Muslim 
Mozambique Samora Machel 1976-1986 Single Party Catholic 
 Joaquim Chissano 1986-2005 Single Party Catholic 
 Armando Guebuza 2005-2015 Single Party Catholic 
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Niger Ibrahim Bare Mainassara 1997-1999` Personal Muslim 
Senegal Leopold Senghor 1961-1980 Single Party Catholic 
 Abdou Diouf 1981-2000 Single Party Muslim 
Sierra Leone Siaka Stephens 1969-1985 Single Party Protestant 
 Joseph Momoh 1985-1992 Single Party Protestant 
 Johhny Koroma 1998 Personal Protestant 
Sudan Omar Al-Bashir 1990-Pres. Personal Muslim 
Tanzania Julius Nyerere 1965-1985 Single Party Catholic 
 Ali Hassan Mwini 1985-1995 Single Party Muslim 
 Benjamin Mkapa 1995-2005 Single Party Protestant 
 Jakaya Kikiwete 2005-Pres. Single Party Muslim 
Togo Etienne Eyadema 1968-1974 Personal Catholic 
 Gnassingbe Eyadema 1974-2005 Personal Catholic 
 Faure Gnassingbe 2005-Pres. Personal Catholic 
Uganda Apollo Obote 1966-1971 Personal Other 
 Idi Amin 1971-1979 Personal Muslim 
 Apollo Obote 1980-1985 Personal Other 
 Yoweri Museveni 1986-Pres. Personal Protestant (Anglican) 
Zambia Kenneth Kaunda 1964-1991 Single Party 
Protestant 
(Presbyterian) 
 Federick Chiluba 1997-2002 Single Party Protestant (Pentecostal) 
 Levey Mwanawasa 2002-2008 Single Party Protestant (Baptist) 
 Rupiah Banda 2008-2011 Single Party Protestant (Anglican) 
Zimbabwe Canaan Banana 1981-1987 Single Party Protestant (Methodist) 
 Robert Mugabe 1987-Pres. Single Party Catholic 
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